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The study examines the relationship between complexity and organisational responses to 
critical supply chain failure, it also assess whether the operating principles of high reliability 
organisations („HROs‟) can offer any benefit to commercial organisations in avoiding or 
mitigating the impact of future critical failure events.  
Supply chain performance is a necessity for maintaining competitive advantage within the 
market place; global firms look to use the supply chain to access global markets, raw 
materials, scarce skills and cost competitive labour.  As supply chain networks become more 
globalised these open systems become more complex and exposed to failure. The cost of a 
supply chain failure in operational performance and reputational damage is high.  
This study develops a conceptual framework for assessing complexity of a supply chain 
within the aerospace industry sector, taking into consideration both complexities derived 
through product manufacturing process and supply chain configuration. Then four case 
studies of recent critical supply chain failures from the Rolls-Royce Group are applied to this 
framework and a qualitative structured interview process conducted with those personnel 
involved in the response to this supply chain failure. An assessment is made from the 
interview outcomes on whether in the cases reviewed complexity changes the response, 
how it should influence future responses and whether „HRO‟ principles would have had any 
value in pre-empting or responding to the failure.  
The study indicated that complexity does influence the type of organisational response to a 
critical supply chain failure; within the case studies reviewed this was particularly 
pronounced as manufacturing process complexity varied. Though it was noted that this 
change in response was not a planned or structured decision process arising from an 
organisational awareness to complexity, but a haphazard response to a critical customer 
failure. The study scope was limited to the „Rotatives‟ commodity supply chains. Research 
indicated that effective adoption of HRO principles in these cases would have avoided or 
mitigated the customer disruption caused by these critical supply chain failures, the key 
outcomes were; the group fails to integrate „signals‟ and „indicators‟ that might provide an 
„early warning alarm‟ about critical supply chain failure, those individuals who are best post 
positioned to foresee supply chain disruption within the network (though not necessarily 




methodologies following a critical supply chain failure are not cross-functionally consistent or 
integrated – impacting the pace and quality of fix and containment in these incidences. 
Using complexity to direct a standardised organisational response would allow the Rolls-
Royce business to be more proficient in its containment and fix activities in response to a 
critical supply chain failure; though the limited scope of the case studies to the Rotatives 
commodity means that the sample of cases reviewed would need to be increased, taking in 
a broader scope of commodities and „mix‟ of supply chain complexities thus having sufficient 
scope of relevance for Rolls-Royce practitioners to adopt. In response to the adoption of 
HROs principles a number of priority areas were identified. Firstly, the business needs to be 
able to recognise and „stem‟ the „incubation period‟ of critical supply chain failures; this will 
happen through identification of „lead indicators‟ for supply chains that signify potential 
pending failure, a process for integrating these lead indicators to act as meaningful 
intelligence that supply chain practitioners can use to pre-empt supply chain failure in order 
to take pro-active action to avoid or mitigate customer disruption. Secondly, making use of 
key roles within the supply chain network that have early visibility of potential hazards in 
order to increase early feedback of intelligence. Thirdly, adopting a cross-functionally agreed 
problem resolution methodology for responding to events of critical supply chain failure, 
ensuring that governance puts pace into a comprehensive cross-functionally agreed set of 















CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Supply Chains as a source of Competitive Advantage 
 
It is broadly recognised that effective supply chains offer organisations the opportunity to 
establish a sustainable source of competitive advantage within the market place (Brewer and 
Speh, 2000). Successful supply chains are those that are focused on delivering customer 
value whilst driving out non-value added cost (Brewer and Speh, 2000; Christopher, 1998). 
Dell Computers, Walmart and Hewlett Packard are a number of companies who attribute 
commercial success to successful execution of their supply chain strategies.  
 
Yet the challenges on configuring and managing supply networks within the modern 
globalised economy to realise supply chains as a sustainable lever of competitive advantage 
are increasingly more demanding. Global supply chains are characterised by spanning 
geographical, economic, judicial, cultural and ethical boundaries. As complexity of a supply 
chain network grows the opportunity for failure also increases.  For most organisations the 
need to operate with a globalised supply chain network is a necessity; allowing access to a 
global market footprint, opportunity to utilise skilled and cost competitive labour markets and 
access to raw materials. Whilst necessity, Christopher et al (2002) argues that globalisation 
of the supply network leads to an increased level of risk exposure.  
 
1.2 Supply Chain Failure 
 
As risk exposure increases for the supply chain network, so does the chance that failure may 
arise and that supply chains may become the achilles heel of an organisations performance. 
Examples of disruptions and impacts are becoming increasingly more common, with 
catastrophic natural events, political instability and more localised technical and supply chain 
configuration issues becoming commonly cited sources of failure. Toyota, Nissan, Sony, 
Panasonic and Boeing are a handful of company who have in 2011 have publically 
expressed profitability concerns directly related to component supply capability.    
 
In some cases, particularly those environmental risks which could have been neither 
predicted nor mitigated, supply chain failure is unavoidable. Though in the majority of cases 
supply chain failure modes can be foreseen and through effective supply chain management 




failure, both in the actions and pace on the fix and containment, will determine their success 
to limit operational damage and prevent re-occurrences of the same failure mode – setting 
them apart from their competitors. Recognition of the need to be effective at responding to 
supply chain failure is not novel, and strategies, tactics and process to enable this readiness 
are already an everyday part of corporate discourse.  
 
1.3 Aerospace Supply Chains 
 
The shift towards a more globalised supply network has become intrinsic in aerospace 
supply chain configuration as global airframe and engine OEM‟s look to secure the benefits 
of both a global supply and demand network. Aerospace sector growth in 2011, both in the 
civil and defence sectors, is predominantly Asia Pacific lead making access to these markets 
at pace a necessity by large industrial aerospace firms. Both Boeing, Airbus and engine 
manufacturers Rolls-Royce and GE Aviation have a mixture of wholly owned, joint venture 
and sub-tier supply chain network operations within the Asia-Pacific region.  
 
Notwithstanding the challenges already discussed surrounding the shift towards globalised 
supply networks the aerospace supply chain faces some unique challenges that offer further 
complexity and risk exposure to the security of supply, these include; sensitivity to the 
economic cycle- with peaks and troughs in the load requirement, high capital expenditure 
requirements to secure new capacity, end-to-end highly regulated supply chains where 
product traceability is a necessity, long product lifecycles relative to consumer product 
markets and long lead-times in securing scarce raw material supplies.  
 
Supply chain disruption in the aerospace sector, particularly associated with new product 
development, has been widely reported in recent years. Most high-profile of these the delays 
to the Boeing 787 Dreamliner programme triggered by failure in their modularised sub-
system supply chain (Financial Times, 2010), and earlier delays in supply of composite 
component supply due to its supply networks technical maturity in manufacturing capability 
(Financial Times, 2007). Airbus, part of the EADS group, experienced similar supply chain 
disruption in the component supply on harnesses in 2005-2006 driving a two year 
programme delay – resulting from both supplier technical maturity with novel technology and 
Airbus sub-system integration issues. Most recently Boeing, GE Aviation and Rolls-Royce 
have all experienced component supply disruption following the closure of the IHI 





1.4 Rolls-Royce plc – the Supply Chain challenge 
 
Rolls-Royce plc is a global power solutions provider, the Group‟s core technology is the Gas 
Turbine platform. The group operates across four key markets, including Civil, Marine, 
Defence and Energy. The Civil Aerospace business, the largest of the market sectors 
served, is number one supplier of engines in terms of market-share to airframe 
manufacturers Boeing and Airbus within the wide-body sector. Its principle product offering 
to the Civil Aerospace market is the Trent Engine family, of which there are six derivatives 
either in service or within development.  
 
The Rolls-Royce plc business has observed a notable period of growth over the last decade, 
with a doubling of annual sales revenue and underlying profit before tax. The most 
significant indicator for Rolls-Royce plc though is the order book, declared in the Rolls-Royce 
plc 2011 Annual Report as £59bn, approximately six years worth of sales. Of which the Civil 
Aerospace business accounts for £48bn; of this approximately fifty percent of the order book 
is for customers within the Asia Pacific / Middle East Region. To contextualise the challenge 
this presents for the group it currently has approximately 1700 installed Trent Engines in-
service, it has a firm order book for a further 2400 engines. Beyond this original equipment 
task the group also expects to see further expansion of its services demand stream as the 
installed engine base grows, aftermarket services currently represents fifty per cent of Civil 
sales revenues. There is a step-change in operational performance required of the Rolls-
Royce group.  
 
For Rolls-Royce plc the ability of its supply chain to deliver, fault free, will be a necessary 
pre-requisite to being able to meet all its customer obligations within the coming decade. To 
be ready to meet the programme rate a significant programme of supply chain development 
is well established, to ensure that both capacity and capability within the supply chain will 
exist. Much of the supply chain development is happening outside of the UK, Western 
Europe and North America where the historical supply chain networks have been pre-
dominantly based. Multiple joint ventures are in-place with the Chinese State Industries for 
component manufacture; a new Engine assembly production and Fan Blade Manufacturing 
facility is being built in Singapore and an extensive programme of first tier supplier 
development in „low cost‟ regions within the Asia Pacific, South America and Eastern Europe 
are in progress. These new supply chain configurations, whilst necessary to support the 
business requirement, will add complexity and inevitably increase risk exposure and variety 





1.5 Aims of this study 
 
For Rolls-Royce the increased complexity of its supply chains to meet the growth task will 
present increased risk exposure for the business, and incidences of supply chain failure at 
some point are inevitable. The aims of this study are to understand whether complexity of a 
supply chain can be used to direct the appropriate containment and fix of an incidence of 
supply chain failure, and understand what lessons can be learnt about recent incidences of 
supply chain failure that might make the organisation develop capability to operate „failure 
free‟ supply chains in the future.   
 
1.6 Objectives of this Study 
 
The objectives of the study are: 
 
Firstly, develop a conceptual framework that can be used to objectively assess the 
complexity of a supply chain, taking into account the complexity associated with both the 
supply chain configuration and the inherent technical complexity of product manufacture. 
 
Secondly, map four recent examples from the Rolls-Royce supply chain that have 
experienced a significant supply failure and conduct a cross-functional primary research 
study to evaluate whether, and how, complexity has changed the organisations response to 
addressing the failure. 
 
Thirdly, assess whether guidelines on how the Rolls-Royce group should address future 
occurrences of supply chain failure based on the complexity of the supply chain offer value 
to Rolls-Royce practitioners.  
 
Fourthly, provide a set of recommendations about what „lessons can be learnt‟ from our 
responses to previous supply chain failures to prevent repeat occurrences through adoption 







CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This study looks to bring a new perspective on the already much discussed domain of critical 
supply chain failure amongst both practitioners and academics. It seeks to do that on two 
fronts.  
Firstly, understanding the significance of the role played by complexity and whether that 
does, or should bear, any significance in how organisations respond to critical supply chain 
failures. Complexity theory is an already established body of knowledge and within the 
business management context is commonly explored within organisational behaviour 
discourse, though limited research has been done to understand complexity within the 
supply chain context – thus, questions such as “how do we measure supply chain 
complexity?”, or “what does complexity mean to how we manage our supply chains?” are yet 
largely unanswered.  
Secondly the study will look to explore whether the body of knowledge on management 
practices and principles within High Reliability Organisations that have typically been applied 
within “mission critical” public management organisations, such as Air Traffic Control and 
Nuclear Facilities management, can have any „read-across‟ within the private supply chain 
management context. This challenging the implicit premise of supply chain literature that, at 
some point, supply chain failure is an inevitability of complex global supply chains.     
 
2.1 Supply Chain Definition 
“...A supply chain encompasses all the activities associated with moving goods from 
the raw material stage through the end user...” Brewer and Speh (2000), pg 76. 
Christopher (1992) states a supply chain to be a network of organizations that through 
upstream and downstream linkages use different activities and processes to generate value 
to deliver products or services to customers.  Similar definition is given by Handfield and 
Nichols (1999).  
A supply chain is typically characterised by having multiple stakeholders that are typically 
geographically separated. Supply chains are not homogenous, nor limited to a specific 




dependent on the product or service being delivered. Supply Chains typically involve the 
engagement of cross-functional personnel and extend across firm boundaries (Brewer and 
Speh, 2000).   
Beamon (1999) characterises the most simple supply chain as having four „echelons‟, 
consisting of supply, manufacturing, distribution, and consumers, where each echelon (or 
tier) can have multiple entities. Thus, she argues complexity of a supply chain is influenced 
by the number of echelons (or tiers) and entities operating at each echelon.  
Brewer and Speh (2000) argue that the tasks typically completed by organisations within a 
supply chain include “....transportation, warehousing, information processing and materials 
handling...”. They go on to cite the functions completed throughout the supply chain to 
include “...sourcing, procurement, production scheduling, manufacturing, order processing, 
inventory management, warehousing and customer service...”.  
 
2.3 „Supply Chains Competing‟ 
„Internetwork competition‟ is now the norm of business management (Lambert and Cooper, 
2000). The ability for organisations to succeed depends on the effectiveness of the full 
value-chain in delivering to customer requirements: 
“...Instead of brand versus brand or store versus store, it is now suppliers-brand-store versus 
suppliers-brand-store, or supply chain versus supply chain...”. 
 Lambert and Cooper (2000) p65. 
Christopher (1998) referred to this shift as “supply chains competing”. Brewer and Speh 
(2000), argue that supply chain management practices will derive a “sustainable source of 
competitive advantage” for businesses in the future, Christopher (1998) also acknowledges 
the role of supply chains as a source of competitive advantage.  Antai (2011) argues that the 
notion of „competing supply chains‟ within academic literature is not new, however 
challenges that the conceptual “meaning, usage and acceptance” of the term „competing 
supply chains‟ and is still under debate within academic discourse. Christopher (1998) 
argues that in essence the point is that no organisation can “...act as isolated, independent 
entities in competition with other organizations...”.  




“...Successful supply chains will effectively coordinate their processes, focus on delivering 
customer value, eliminate unnecessary costs in key functional areas, and create 
performance measurement systems that provide data on whether the supply chain is 
performing up to expectations...”. 
        Brewer and Speh (2000), pg75. 
Shepherd and Gunter (2005), citing Ferguson (2002), argue that a performing supply chain 
should offer the benefits of reduced costs, increased market share and build „solid‟ customer 
relations. Research indicates the role played by supply chains in determining business 
performance is understood by practitioners; Thomas (1999) cites a survey conducted by 
Deloitte Consulting of North American Manufacturing firms, ninety-one percent of whom 
reported their supply chains as either being important or critical to the success of the 
organisation.  
Performance measurement of supply chain is a field of study that has received significant 
focus, with extensive academic and practitioner debate surrounding what to measure, how 
often to measure and how to report the outcomes. Further information on supply chain 
performance measurement can be found in Beamon (1999), Neeley et al (1997) and Camp 
(1989).  
 
2.4 Changing Pressures of Supply Chains: Globalisation and Mass-Customization 
Much academic and practitioner literature cites the changing landscape of the external 
environment which is changing the expectations on supply chains and the ways in which 
they operate. Globalisation and mass-customization are two prominent themes explored 
within the general supply chain academic literature.  
2.4.1 Globalisation 
Globalisation of supply chain networks are cited as stimulating increased levels of interest on 
supply chain management (Webster, 2002). Humphrey (2003) argues that globalisation for 
most company supply chains is an unavoidable necessity, citing access to raw materials, 
scarce skillsets, competitive labour rates and markets as being the key incentives in most 
instances. Christopher et al (2002) highlights that globalisation of both the market and 
international supply network relationships have led to higher exposure in supply chain risk. 
For the market Christopher et al (2002) argues that increased risk is particularly acute 




perspective Christopher argues that the risks are wide and varied, Johnson (2006) cites the 
examples of natural disasters and global pandemics impacting global production facilities 
and physical logistics transit routes. Johnson (2006) points out though that globalisation 
does not only increase exposure to risk it also encourages organisations to build in greater 
levels of complexity to their systems and control mechanisms making inherent process or 
system failure more likely.  
2.4.2 Mass-Customisation  
A more „customer orientated‟ market approach across the delivery of both physical and 
digital goods and services is creating a requirement for mass-customisation of goods and 
service supply to the market (Warkenti et al, 2002), this is being enabled by developments of 
information technology application.  
The implication for practitioners Warkenti et al argues is that supply chains based on 
„traditional media channels‟ linking firms through “linear, inefficient relationships” will no 
longer serve the market requirements. Supply chains must respond to the challenges of 
customisation. These Warkenti et al suggest are characterised by two defining attributes, 
firstly bi-directional information flow along the supply chain and secondly increasing supply 
chain disintermediation. Pine (1993) suggests that the changes in expectations on 
customisation means supply chains fundamentally have to rethink their “make-to-x” 
strategies, deploying enablers such as postponement and modularisation to remain 
responsive to customer requirement.   
 
2.5 Aerospace Supply Chains 
Supply chains are not homogenous; the aerospace sector, including both original equipment 
(OE) Airframe and Engine manufacturers as well as their extended supply chains face 
multiple and complex supply chain challenges; with the key themes including globalisation in 
demand and supply base, rapid manufacturing technology and product development 
expectations, the rise of the low cost emerging component supply base, increasingly global 
and more complex safety regulations and increasing scarcity in rare and raw material supply, 
all challenging the effective operations of aerospace supply chains. Dietrich and Cudney 
(2010), citing Miltenburg (2009) argue that determining an effective manufacturing and 




“Companies face both a variety of choices, because of rapidly changing product and process 
technologies, a global competitive environment, informed customers, demand owners and 
environmental and political factors impacting the aerospace industry.”  
      Dietrich and Cudney (2010) p2820. 
Delays and disruption in customer delivery programmes and the resulting financial impact, 
across both Airbus and Boeing and the major Engine manufacturers are well-reported 
(Financial Times, 2010). Product development cycles are lengthy, with even new 1st or 2nd 
tier suppliers taking 4 to 6 years to become production ready on a major hardware 
development programme.  
Rebolledo and Nollet (2011) in the International Journal of Production Economics argue that 
the complexity of modern manufacturing technologies exceed the capability of an individual 
firm, and that extended supply chain is a necessary to manage knowledge and investment 
on new hardware programmes. 
Green et al (2005) suggest that because of the high investment levels required to support 
manufacture of aerospace components and the long product lifecycle, often as much as 25 
years, mean long-term partnership arrangements are common within the aerospace sector. 
This they argue can happen in the form of joint-ventures, risk and revenue sharing 
collaboration or long-term contractual arrangements, where the supply chain network is 
typically globally distributed. Rose-Anderssen et al (2009), citing Van Donk and Van der 
Vaart (2004) argue a high level of integration, in the form of joint venture or risk and revenue 
sharing partner, is not only preferable but critical for the performance of an aerospace supply 
chain because of the „complex‟ conditions: 
“Complex conditions are represented by low volume production, high product variety, small 
batches, make-to-order, long delivery time, and flexible suppliers. Aerospace supply chains 
belong to the complex category. They are characterised by a high variety of systems and 
parts that make up an airplane and long-delivery leadtime.”  
Rose-Anderssen et al (2009), pg 194.  
Dietrich and Cudney (2010) cite the Boeing 787 Dreamliner‟s modularisation supply strategy 
as an example of modern OE hardware programme that has an integrative supply chain 
strategy. Rebolledo and Nollet (2011), citing Mayer and Teece 2008, note that the need for 




basis for the „development of long-term co-operative relationships in the supply chain‟.  
Rebolledo and Nollet (2011) describe the shift towards modularisation: 
“...The current trend in the industry is for large companies to focus on core competencies 
and to outsource more design and manufacture. The traditional single component sourcing 
is increasingly replaced by modular architecture and suppliers are expected to provide prime 
contractors with a higher-up assembly...”  
  Rebolledo and Nollet (2011), pg 331.  
Dietrich and Cudney (2010) in the International Journal of Production Research argue that 
the pace of technological development in the Aerospace sector means that engaging the 
extended supply chain in the development of emerging technologies and manufacturing 
processes is unavoidable, but presents the sector with challenges in ensuring capability to 
production achieve rate and in maintaining the quality of supply; meaning both the 
technological and financial risk level a new supply chain partner poses is difficult for OE 
manufacturers to effectively assess prior to sourcing selection.  
Rose-Anderssen et al (2009), citing Samaranyake (2010) points out an aerospace supply 
chain‟s success will be determined by the successful „integration and co-ordination of inter-
firm activities‟. This they will be pre-dominantly determined not by the contractual obligation 
between customer and supplier but rather through the success of „communicative 
interaction‟ between the two parties over time.  
In respect to market size the Asia Pacific region is expected to pass North America as the 
biggest aircraft market in the world (Toloken, 2008). This will challenge supply chains, clearly 
in respect to their supply chain‟s ability to supply finished stock to these regions but also with 
an increasing expectations that sourcing supply chains will be established in the region 
(frequently of a contractual obligation of selling finished hardware in the region). This 
expectation to engage suppliers in the Asia region, in particular China and India, is 
necessary to support cost pressures and a pro-active engagement strategy.  
 
2.6 Supply Chain Management  
Effective management of both relationships and processes across the end-to-end supply 
chain is a pre-requisite to ensuring that „internetwork competition‟ can be achieved 




literature to „SCM‟, is frequently referred to in supply chain discourse as the mechanism to 
either further optimise or address the failings of performance within a supply chain.   
Lambert and Cooper (2000), citing LaLonde (1998) note that Supply Chain Management as 
a „term‟ was initially introduced through the consultancy market during the 1980‟s. It use has 
subsequently been more widely spread, spanning both academic and practitioner use today.  
Countless definitions of the „Supply Chain Management‟ term exist in circulation today, 
however the seminal paper “Defining Supply Chain Management” by Mentzer et al (2001) in 
the Journal of Business Logistics offers the following definition for the term: 
“The systemic, strategic, coordination of the traditional business functions and the tactics 
across these business functions within a particular company and across businesses within 
the supply chain, for the purposes of improving the long-term performance of the individual 
companies and the supply chain as a whole.”  
       Mentzer et al (2001), pg 18. 
Many academic and practitioners are keen to highlight that the essence of what Supply 
Chain Management is trying to achieve is in fact very simple to understand, with practitioner 
Scott Eliff (2010) stating “Supply Chain Management is really about getting people to work 
better together.” 
Eliff argues that Supply Chain Management is a mechanism to address miss-alignments that 
arise across and between organisations due to goal conflicts or simply due to the 
geographical boundaries that may separate individual stakeholders within a supply chain.   
Supply Chain Management can typically be characterised as an activity that spans multiple 
organisations and scopes multiple processes that are involved with both the physical and 
information flows spanning across supply chains. Successful Supply Chain Management, 
Hugos (2006) argues is delivered through the simultaneous improvements in the levels of 
customer service received whilst also managing to improve the operating efficiencies of 
companies.  
Hugos (2006), in „The Essentials of Supply Chain Management‟ argues that whilst there is 
common agreement on the principles and in-tent of Supply Chain Management as a concept 
there lacks any definitive  „all-inclusive‟ agreement on the key stakeholders and processes 




Noting the above it is thus unsurprising that Lambert and Cooper (2006) suggest that 
confusion can often exist between the use of the Supply Chain Management term to the 
more traditional and narrowly focused logistics activity within an organisation. Logistics, they 
argue, is associated with activities within the confines of one organisation and is more 
narrowly focused upon the more „traditional‟ of activities of procurement, distribution and 
management. Where Supply Chain Management is broader in its organisational scope, 
extending across multiple firms [within the supply chain] and scoping broader task including 
new product introduction and customer service.   
The key „drivers‟, Hugos (2006) highlights, that are being managed and controlled through 
the Supply Chain Management include: production, inventory, location, transportation and 
information. The challenge of managing these drivers is to ensure that a balance between 
responsiveness and efficiency can be met in order for an organisation to leverage its supply 
chain as a source of competitive advantage.  
For this to happen Lambert and Cooper (2000) argue: 
“Successful SCM requires a change from managing individual functions to integrating 
activities into key supply chain processes”.  
      Lambert and Cooper (2000), pg 71.  
Conceptual frameworks for directing successful approaches to Supply Chain Management 
within an organisation are multiple, frequently tailored to suit the management of supply 
chains in a specific product, sector or market. Lambert and Cooper (2000) argue that 
irrespective of the context of the supply chain there are though three fundamental „elements 
and key decisions‟ that need to be addressed in determining the appropriate Supply Chain 
Management approach:  
 





The supply chain network structure Hugos (2006) suggests will go beyond „the simple supply 
chain‟ structure of „Supplier <-> Company <-> Customer‟ and scope the extended supply 
chain, which may include an extensive supplier network and multiple customers. Also within 
the extended supply chain will be service providers such as logistics, finance, market 
research and product design.  
Supply chain business processes that link individual supply chain members will vary, but 
Lambert and Cooper (2000) argue that the predominant key processes across supply chains 
include: 
 Customer relationship management 
 Customer service management 
 Demand management 
 Order fulfilment 
 Manufacturing flow management 
 Procurement 
 Product development and commercialisation 
 Returns.  
The process perspective on Supply Chain Management presented by Lambert and Cooper 
extends the five „drivers‟ presented by Hugos as underpinning Supply Chain Management.  
Though typically not highlighted as a supply chain business process in its own right Supplier 
Development is a specific subset of activity within the Supply Chain Management landscape 
focused on ensuring that supply chain capability meets the specific needs of the „buying 
business‟ (Ayers, 2001), activity is typically more targeted on specific suppliers, as opposed 
to SCM practices and processes which are applied more generally across the entire supply 
network. Leenders (1989) describes supplier development as “...creating and maintaining a 
network of competent suppliers”.   




“...A long term co-operative effort between a buying firm and its suppliers to upgrade the 
suppliers technical, quality, redelivery and cost capabilities and to foster ongoing 
improvements...”  
Watts and Hahn, (1993), pg 12.  
Both practitioners and academics recognise the importance played by supplier development 
activity as a means of mitigating against supply chain failure with the Chartered Institute of 
Purchase and Supply (2011) citing benefits, other than cost and delivery, including: 
improving serious quality issues, improving business alignment between supplier and buying 
organisation, offering and developing new routes to supply.  
Ayers (2001) argues that supplier development is a vital element of an organisation‟s Supply 
Chain Management toolkit to both mitigate against and respond to incidences of supply 
chain failure, through building and maintaining collaborative trust based relationships.  
  
2.7 Supply Chain Risk  
Juttner et al (2003) highlight that the ability of a supply chain to perform in line with its 
requirements directly impacts an organisations ability to sustain operations, consequently 
impacting the ability to deliver products or services to the market place – in turn impacting 
revenues, profitability and potentially in the most extreme cases corporate survival. Whilst 
firms are aware of the need to manage supply chain risk it is currently argued that supply 
chain risk is insufficiently understood within large corporate organisations (Heywood and 
Peck, 2010), nor is there sufficient toolkits in place to be able to manage or mitigate potential 
risks (Christopher et al, 2001) 
The academic literature on supply chain risk is often „time-stamped‟ by the examples of 
„external‟ to focal firms exogenous shocks and associated supply chain failures, with Peck 
and Juttner (2000) citing the UK fuel protests of 2000 and the no-fly zone implemented over 
the USA aerospace following the 9/11 Terrorist attacks stopping transit of supply.  However 
exogenous events triggering supply chain failure are un-remitting and rarely in a globalised 
economy is there a period where a supply issue to a specific sector is not a concern. Recent 
and current examples include supermarket supply during of imported fruits during the 
volcanic ash „no-fly‟ period impacting UK and European aerospace (Retail Week, August 




Japanese IHI Corporation following the Japanese and Earthquake of March 2010 
(Bloomberg, 2010).  
Juttner et al (2003), citing March and Shapira (1987) describe risk in the supply chain as: 
“...the variation in the distribution of possible supply chain outcomes, their likelihood, and 
their subjective values”.  
Juttner et al (2003), pg 1404.  
Risk is an intrinsic element of any operation, and March and Shapira (1987) argue that 
practitioners will naturally work to manage and mitigate risk through the usual organisational 
managerial controls and processes.  
Definitions of risk and typologies of risk have had significant academic commentary.  
Zsidisin and Ritchie (2008) suggests that risk within a supply chain can come from three 
sources; internal risks, supply chain risks and external risks. Internal risks arise from 
processes, procedures and activities that arise within the boundary of the company, for 
example in an advanced manufacturing firm this risk may be around meeting and sustaining 
a manufacturing capability of a given process or component. Supply chain risks arise from 
the risk associated with how companies in a supply chain interact (or fail in their 
interactions), including both the information and physical hardware flows over intercompany 
boundaries. The final risk is external supply chain risks and this concerns how the 
relationship between the company and the external environment. The latter, frequently the 
most publically reported risk to supply chains, will include the risks that arise from „act of god‟ 
events or natural disruptions, but also scope risks created by humans including legal and 
political disruption that may disrupt supply chains.  
Juttner (2005), sharing some common ground with the Zsidisin and Ritchie (2008) typology 
describes five risks associated with supply chains as; supply risk, demand risk, process risk, 
control risk and environmental risk. Juttner notes that exposure to risk within a supply chain 
must not be seen as something confined to a single firm within a supply chain, or solely to 
the interaction between two firms – rather risk exposure in a supply chain can occur at any 
point between raw material source and final customer and have the potential to create risk to 
anybody up or downstream in the supply chain.  
Christopher and Lee (2004) identified three sources of supply chain network created risk; 
lack of ownership, chaos, and inertia. Lack of ownership they argue arises from the nature of 




the supply chain, though without any formal orchestration – each stakeholder in the supply 
chain works to optimise their own outcomes, though this may not necessarily work to the 
optimum outcome of the supply chain as a whole. Chaos, Juttner et al (2003) argue, arises 
from: 
“...over-reactions, unnecessary interventions, second-guessing, mistrust, distorted 
information throughout a supply chain or simply from a lack of supply chain understanding 
amongst its organisations...”  
          Juttner et al (2003), pg 12. 
Inertia, Lee et al (1997) argues is created by a supply chains inability to respond to the 
external environment, either a desire or hard inability (for example a contractual 
commitment) mean that supply chains become risk exposed.  
Practitioner literature typically focuses on external sources of risk and impact on business 
operations, though academic literature appears to be more balanced taking into 
consideration internal sources of risk, relating to risk involving key business processes and 
activities (Braithwait and Hall, 1999). Citing Harland and Brenchley (2001), Juttner et al 
(2003) suggest that efforts by literature to propose a more systematic and structured 
approach to supply chain risk management is reasonably recent. Juttner et al (2003) 
propose four key areas in supply chain risk that require further investigation, including; 
assessing the risk sources for the supply chain, defining the risk concept and adverse 
consequences, identifying the risk drivers of the supply chain strategy and mitigating risks for 
the supply chain.  
Tang‟s 2006 paper “Perspectives in Supply Chain Risk Management” in the International 
Journal of Production Economics offers a comprehensive analysis of the supply chain risks 
experienced within modern international supply networks, scoping both supply and demand 
side risks.  
Haywood and Peck (2010) completed qualitative research into supply chain risk within the 
aerospace sector, looking at both the sources of risk and identification of the tools available 
to be able to address the risks. They identified that in terms of risk the sector research 
indicated that managers referred to the supply chain Critical Success Factors (CSFs) as 
driving risk – in particular citing issues around the supplier and commodity management 
processes – cost focused decisions, „extreme‟ quality/performance requirements, delivery 




argued that risk, at least with aerospace sector context, is something that is heavily 
influenced by in the design stages of a supply chain.  
Peck and Juttner (2003) suggest, citing the Aerospace sector as an example, that with 
supply chain networks composed of many thousands of globally located suppliers it is 
difficult to accurately assess the true level of risk exposure, or even the most significant risks 
within a supply chain even to the most competent and pro-active companies.    
Haywood and Peck (2010), corroborated by Braithwaite and Hall (1999), suggest that the 
trend to drive efficiencies within the supply chain network unintentionally drive an increased 
exposure level to risk, citing JIT delivery systems, supplier rationalisation programmes and 
outsourcing of non-core activities to third parties as examples of organisational changes 
increasing exposure.  This, they argue, is exacerbated through the increased trends of 
globalisation – where there has been a shift towards centralisation of manufacturing and 
distribution facilities.  Globalised supply chain that are composed of multiple stakeholders 
and are geographically disparate typically lack ownership or orchestration from end-to-end 
within the supply chain.  
Lee (2004) support the view that modern supply chains, which typically cross international 
boundaries in order to exploit the benefits of an international customer and supply network 
typically hold very high „hidden costs‟ should the supply chain experience disruption.   
Juttner et al (2003) citing Svensson (2002) argues that as risk frequently arises from a 
business need to be competitive, that “calculated risks” are an inevitable consequence in 
many modern corporations. Thus, they go on to argue, that being able to identify and select 
the appropriate risk mitigation strategy are the fundamental requirements  on any corporate 
supply chain risk management strategy.  
Presenting supply chain risk management as a managerial concept Juttner et al (2003) 
argue that it has four „basic constructs‟, these include: 
“....(1) Assessing the risk sources for the supply chain; (2) identifying the risk concept of the 
supply chain by defining the most relevant risk consequences (3) tracking the risk drivers in 
the supply chain strategy and (4) mitigating risks in the supply chain....”  
Juttner et al (2003) pg4.  
Peck and Juttner (2003) state though that for adoption of any risk management construct to 
be effective it needs to take place across the supply chain, and not confirmed within the 




Juttner et al (2003) argue that conceptually there are four key strategies that can be 
deployed within a supply chain to manage risk. These included avoidance of risk, typically 
through exiting specific markets; control of risk through techniques such as buffering or 
increased levels of vertical integration within the supply chain; co-operation with the supply 
chain in order to jointly identify, manage or mitigate risk and flexibility through dual or 
multiple sourcing agreements.   
Haywood and Peck (2010) argue that the research with practitioners indicates greatest 
concern is raised with regard to risks generated through „tensions between individual 
process performance measures‟,  as opposed to external risk. Therefore effective risk 
management strategies should be developed, deployed and embedded, Haywood and Peck 
(2010) suggest, through the supply chain planning, supply chain management and supply 
chain change management practices already intrinsic within an organisations operating 
practices.   
Tang (2006b) argues that those companies who successfully manage to mitigate supply 
chain disruption have done it through pro-active deployment of mitigation strategies. The 
International Journal of Logistics Paper proposes nine unique strategies that could be 
adopted by organisations in order to mitigate both demand and supply side risks; 
Supply-side mitigation strategies include; Postponement, strategic stock, flexible supply 
base, make-and-buy, economic supply incentives and flexible transportation. 
Demand-side mitigation strategies include; Revenue management, dynamic assortment 
planning and silent product roll-over. 
Tang argues though that for each mitigation strategy to be adopted organisations must 
balance cost versus benefit and consider the strategic fit with their business.   
 
2.8 Complexity theory and Supply Chains 
Given the number of participants and the level of information required to be exchanged 
complexity is an inherent phenomenon of even the most simple supply chain networks 
(Sellitto, 2009).  
In the literature complexity theory has been developed and adopted through different 





“...In the abiotic world systems are described as being complex, because they have 
numerous internal elements,  dynamic, because their global behaviour is governed by local 
interactions between the elements, and dissipative, because they have to consume energy 
to maintain stable global patterns...”   
                    Geyer (2003), pg 6.  
However, he goes on to argue that complexity can also be used within a social science 
context to describe the non-linear complex dynamics that arises from human uniqueness in 
engaging with systems. 
 
 
Table 2: Linear to non-linear dynamic systems. Source Geyer (2003): The Range of Abiotic, Biotic and Conscious Phenomena. 
Conscious complexity and the non-linear dynamics that arise from it are an inherent part of 
modern global supply chains.  
Citing Sassi (2006) Sellitto cites the occurrence of globalisation and increasing heterogeneity 
in the supply network as all working to increase complexity with the supply chain: 
 
“...The first acts, among others reasons, when we have: increased distance of transportation 




along the chain and the transportation. The last appears due to the increased quantity of 
firms, with different accounting, marketing and production practices, that must be put 
together in order to achieve a unified business objective....”  
          Sassi (2006), pg2. 
Thus it is unsurprising some practitioners have already begun to draw relationship between 
supply chain management and complexity theory. The initial link in describing supply chains 
as complex adaptive systems was initially proposed by Choi et al (2001). Sellitto (2009) and 
Pathak et al (2007) develop the Complex Adaptive System (CAS) concept. Choi et al (2001) 
said that they had similarities in three respects; internal mechanisms, environment and co-
evolution.  
Wang and Wang (2002) cite Wang (2002) as describing a supply chain as being “...a bit of 
an open complex giant system...”.  
Though Wang and Wang (2002) report some level of CAS modelling has taken place with 
supply chains to understand the effect micro-agents behaviour can have from a “bottom up” 
perspective on the macro supply chain performance they recognise to date this has been 
limited, normally based on „static‟ scenarios, and not taken into account the all the dynamic 
events that typically present themselves within a normal supply chain. Thus whilst a link 
between supply chains and complexity is recognised and agreed across the academic 
community research into supply chains as complex systems is at this stage fairly immature.  
 
2.9 High Reliability Organisations 
Complexity needn‟t necessarily mean failure is inevitable. Significant exploration in academic 
literature over recent years of the „High Reliability Organisation‟, often abbreviated to „HRO‟ 
indicates that organisations can develop organisational capability to „build in‟ reliability to 
their processes and procedures. LaPorte and Consolini describe a HRO as one that 
operates with „failure free performance‟. System failure is neither expected nor tolerated in 
HROs. The HRO concept is particularly evident in high risk environments, such as that of 
Nuclear Power Plant management, Air Traffic Control Systems or within Operating Theatres, 
though there is no reason why the practices and principles could not be read across to less 
„mission critical‟ organisations (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991), including manufacturing and 




HRO theory recognises that organisations often operate with multiple systems that span the 
boundaries of multiple organisations, and in environments that face „dynamic physical, 
economic, and political environments (Smart et al, 2003). The HRO theory adopts an 
organisational view based on „system-theoretical thinking‟ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) describing HROs:  
“...HROs do not consider themselves to be predictable machines whose performance is 
jeopardized by human error. They are more likely to describe themselves as being non-
trivial, unpredictable systems in which something unexpected can happen at every 
moment...”  
       Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010), pg11. 
The HRO concept was initially developed in the University of California (Hopkins, 2007). 
Though definitions of HROs can be varaible Hopkins (2007) suggests La Porte‟s definitions 
are the most widely recognised:“....Organisations that function in a “nearly error-free 
fashion”....” (La Porte and Consolini, 1998).  
LaPorte and Consolini (1991) argue that HROs learning from „trial and error‟ is not a robust 
method of system improvement. Organisations need to be ready for failure, even during 
„quiet‟ periods and must become „acute‟ to changes in the environment in which they operate 
with a readiness to respond to „worst case‟ scenarios (Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon, 2010). 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that organisations must be ready to challenge assumptions 
about the future based on the past, which are typically rooted in experience based 
perception; thus developing processes that continually remind an organisation to its 
vulnerabilities is the core goal of a HRO organisation (Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon, 2010).  
Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) propose that there HROs operate with a paradox: 
“...preparedness for change is the prerequisite for reliable performance...” (pg4) 
Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) argue that „failure tolerant‟ organisations become „too 
focused‟ on „expectations, plans and past success‟: 
“...Individuals collectively validated expectations made in the past and extrapolated them into 
the future. Companies lack principles which force them to gather and appraise conflicting 
information and to revise laid-out plans and decisions...” 




It is suggested that there are at least 3 conceptual challenges facing HROs, these LaPorte 
and Consolini (1991) argue are : 
“...(1) decisionmaking in the face of catastrophic error, (2) structural responses to hazards 
and peakloads, and (3) challenges of modling tightly coupled interdependence...” 
       LaPorte and Consolini (1991), pg 22.   
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue that there are five processes that HRO organisations 
deploy: 
“...(1) pre-occupation with failures with failure rather than successes, (2) reluctance to 
simplify interpretations, (3) sensitivity to operations, (4) commitment to resilience and (5) 
deference to expertise, as exhibited by encouragement of a fluid decision-making...” 
Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) 
Pre-occupation with failure concerns, Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) suggest is where 
organisations see process failures as a valuable source of information on failure modes, the 
circumstances surrounding the failure are evaluated to understand the „lessons learnt‟ and 
measures to prevent future occurrences. This they suggest is supported by a blame free 
culture.  
Reluctance to simplify, is where organisations are encouraged not to oversimplify the failure 
mode. This involves getting cross-functional engagement on why a failure has arisen to offer 
views and challenges, not being accepting of „murphy‟s law‟ (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  
Sensitivity to operations, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) argue is where organisations manage to 
have a dual focus on long-term plans but also „read‟ the operational landscape as a potential 
indicator for failure, evaluating where non-routine or abnormal occurrences or patterns might 
indicate an increased likelihood of future failure.  
Commitment to resilience is achieved in HROs by „building in redundancy‟ to processes 
(Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon, 2010), de-coupling processes which could potentially trigger chain 
reactions (even if this in the short term trades some efficiency) and investing heavily on 
informal networks to allow organisations to quickly respond to problems in a dynamic 
manner.  
Deference to expertise is about ensuring that decision making is aligned to those with the 
most experience, knowledge and expertise to be able to offer flexible decision making 




the front line‟ and closest to the operation. Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) cite the use of 
andon cords on the Toyota vehicle production lines which are used by production line 
operatives to stop vehicle manufacture in the occurrence of a quality or manufacturing 
process failure.  
Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010) suggest the biggest overarching „lever‟ for developing 
reliability within organisation capability is emphasis on „self-observation processes‟, this 
thinking can be prompted in an organisation by engagement of outsiders because: 
“...they can pinpoint the organisations self referential logic and counteract the unavoidable 
tendency towards normalisation...”  
       Gebauer and Kiel-Dixon (2010), pg 20. 
Hopkins et al (2007), describes the HRO using Weber‟s concept (citing Bendix 1966) of an 
„ideal type organisation‟. He goes on to argue that because it is an „ideal type‟, no 
organisation will ever achieve HRO in its entirety, though modern organisations he suggests 

















CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 
3.1 Research Question and Key Areas of Theory 
This study seeks to assess whether supply chain complexity does, or should, influence 
organisational responses to critical supply chain failures and what lessons can be learnt from 
high reliability organisations in preventing future critical failures.  
The research will be addressed through review of case studies of critical supply chain 
failures within the Rolls-Royce plc aerospace supply chain.  
This study draws the academic bodies of knowledge on supply chain management, supply 
chain risk management, complexity and high reliability organisations as its foundation.  
 
3.2 Research Design  
 3.2.1 Addressing the Research Question 
The research question will be conducted in a three phased approach.  
In the first phase a conceptual framework to assess complexity within supply chains will be 
established through the use of a focal group of key supply chain practitioners with Rolls-
Royce plc in order to evaluate the dimensions on which a supply chains complexity could be 
assessed.  This will be used as a basis for reviewing the complexity of cases within the 
study. Completion of phase 1 is a necessary pre-requisite to enable case study selection for 
phase 2.  
Phase 2 of the research process will be to identify four supply chains that deliver into the 
Rotatives Supply Chain Unit and have demonstrated a critical supply chain failure over the 
last 18 month period. Using the complexity assessment criteria developed in phase 1 this 
assessment will be completed independently. Supply chains for the case study review will be 
selected at random, though it will be a necessary pre-requisite that personnel engaged with 
the recovery of those supply chains are available and willing to provide contribution to the 
research in order to proceed with a case study.   
Phase 3 of the research will involve 1-2-1 structured interviews with those personal engaged 
with managing the recovery of the supply chains that have experienced a critical failure. 




basis dataset for answering the research questions. It is expected that the sample size of the 
supply chains to be reviewed will be four, and that in order to get breath of perspective the 
functions of Supply Chain Planning and Control, Manufacturing Engineering, Quality and 
Purchase will all be involved in providing a response a response on each case study.  
 
3.2.2 Selection of Research Methods 
A qualitative method will be adopted to answer the research questions. The structured 
interview format is intended to be a means to present „open ended‟ questions of those 
managing the supply chain.  
Use of qualitative research methodology within this study has broad academic support given 
the topic being reviewed; Scott (1990) suggests this methods allows for „micro level‟ cases to 
be reviewed in fine detail and that issues such as causality can be explored in greater depth 
then a more quantitative approach would necessarily allow. Further to this Bulmer (1984) 
suggests that the open-ended interview approach can allow for different respondents to 
present their own „differing accounts of reality‟, where quantitative methods tend to close 
avenue for deeper exploration of such issues. This he goes on to argue is important is 
situations where there may be significant underlying social dynamics.  
 
 
3.3 Research Setting and Context 
3.3.1 Introduction 
This study will utilise actual case study scenarios from the Rolls-Royce Group plc Rotatives 
Supply Chain Unit; identifying four supply chains that have suffered significant customer 
failure at some period in the 18 months proceeding April 2011. The criteria for „significant 
customer failure‟ has been determined as breakdown in supply of this component as having 
triggered either an engine build stop either in the new production OEM build line or build stop 
on aftermarket overhaul engine build line. An introduction to the Rolls-Royce Group and the 






3.3.2 Rolls-Royce plc Group Overview 
 General Overview of Rolls-Royce Plc – Salients, Products and Markets 
Rolls-Royce plc is a global power solutions company. The company‟s core product offerings 
are based around the delivery of OEM gas turbine applications and supporting aftermarket 
component and service provision across four key sectors – Civil Aerospace, Marine, 
Defence and Energy. The Group‟s core operations include engine component manufacture, 
OEM engine assembly, engine repair and overhaul and engine diagnostic monitoring. The 
Group also has a recently formed Civil Nuclear business. Rolls-Royce plc Corporate HQ is 
Derby, UK – with sector HQ‟s being globally located including the UK, North America and 
Singapore. Significant manufacture and assembly operations are now located internationally. 
The group is listed in the FTSE100 and traded on the London Stock Exchange.  In 2009 the 
Group had an annual sales revenue of £10.1bn and employed 38,500 personnel globally 
(Rolls-Royce Annual Report, 2009). The Group Chief Executive is University of Nottingham 
alumnus John Rishton.  
The Group has seen a significant development in its product portfolio over the last decade, 
securing significant market access opportunities across all of its four operating sectors. This 
resulted in an order book growth for the Group from £24.4bn to £58.3bn over the 2005 to 
2010 period.  Notable exploited market opportunities have include engine offerings on the 
Airbus A320 XWB, Airbus A380 and Boeing 787 Dreamliner in the Civil Aerospace sector, 
powering the F136 fighter jet and Airbus A400M military transporter aircraft in the Defence 
sector and engine provision on the Littoral Combat ship for the Marine sector.  
The Rolls-Royce Group is structured in a matrix organisation format, consisting of 3 key 
elements: Customer Facing Business Units (CFBUs), the Gas Turbine Supply Chain (GTSC) 
business and other supporting Corporate Functions.  
Customer Facing Business Units (CFBUs) are the „shop window‟ of the business to the 
external customer for each of the key operating sectors, the key accountabilities of these 
business are to manage market/company interfaces - including product definition, cascade 
of requirement to supply chain, customer management, assembly and test operations for 
OEM equipment and aftermarket component and services co-ordination. CFBUs are profit 
and loss accountable entities.  
The Gas Turbine Supply Chain (GTSC) business is a group of 11 Supply Chain Units 
(SCUs) that are completely accountable for component engineering design definition and 




developed around specific commodity types, with both global purchase and manufacture 
capability for the given commodities. The GTSC business [and the businesses contained 
within] are cost centre operations.  
Both the CFBUs and GTSCs are transcended by 21 corporate functions. The role of the 
functions is to provide capability both through the delivery of people and process to support 
task execution.   
 
Rotatives SCU (Basis of the case study examples) 
The Rotatives SCU, part of the GTSC business, is responsible for the supply [either through 
procurement or manufacture] of all critical rotating engine components within the Rolls-
Royce product portfolio. This includes but is not limited to high and intermediate pressure 
turbine discs, mainline shafts, intermediate and high pressure compressor drums and blisks 
– see photograph 1 below for an illustration of the component mix. The operating 
environment and conditions of aero engine rotating components means the integrity of 
supplied parts is defined with finite tolerances, making manufacture of these components 
timely and costly. Nearly all Rotatives product portfolio are categorised as „critical 
components‟, meaning the integrity of these parts has a significant impact on product safety, 
product performance or both if it were to be sub-standard.  
 
Photograph 1: Rotatives Supply Chain Unit Example Products 
The Rotatives SCU, head-quartered in Derby (UK), employees approximately 3000 
employees full-time with significant engineering, manufacturing and procurement presence 
in Indianapolis (North America), Derby (UK), Oberursel (Germany) and Tokyo (Japan). The 
SCU sells at cost to the CFBU and has an approximate global sales revenue of ~£500m 




The Rotatives Purchase team manage a network of 20 suppliers, that whilst principally 
suppliers of rotating commodity components will also supply direct into other supply chain 
units. This includes two RRSP (Risk and Revenue Sharing Partners) with Ishikawajima-
Harima Heavy Industries (IHI) and Kawasaki Heavy Industry (KHI) both located in Japan. 
The Rotatives Purchase network is spread globally between Europe, North America and 
Asia Pacific.   
Rotatives purchase input is either delivered into the Rotatives Domestic Manufacturing 
Plants as „bought out finished‟ components for assembly into finished units in one of the 
Rotatives Domestic Manufacturing plant or shipped direct from supplier to the Rolls-Royce 
customer as a fully finished certified component.  
Rotatives has four domestic component manufacturing plants each producing key 
commodities. Derby D-Site manufacturing Discs and Drums and Shafts, Sunderland 
manufacturing Turbine discs and Annesley manufacturing bladed discs.  
 
Map 1: Rotatives SCU Manufacturing and Vendor Locations 
Due to the performance expectations on a Rotating component in service, operating at 
extreme temperatures and with significant stresses the manufacturing tolerances and 
sensitivity are closely controlled and regulated. Aerospace regulators, such as the European 
EASA, UK CAA and US FAA expect full end to end traceability of manufacturing process 
and source on all Rotatives supplied components (irrespective of whether they be supplier 




heightened level of regulation, often referred to as „Critical Component‟ status indicates the 
challenges and complexity involved in the manufacturing process.  
The typical manufacturing lead-time of a Rotating component is approximately between 3 to 
6 months. With an average cost of supply between £50 - £200k per component.  Typically 
for each commodity there are two to three rotating components delivered per engine, making 
rotating parts low volume high complexity manufacturing.  
 
3.4 Research Sample and Datasources  
The case studies to be selected are to be identified from the Rotatives Supply Chain Unit, 
the selection criteria will be any supply chain that has caused a critical supply chain failure 
within the previous 18 month period (resulting in either a customer build stop or clock stop), 
within the company these parts are known as „P1‟ parts, denoting the number 1 priority parts 
because of the reputational damage that they are causing the business.  
Four supply chains case studies will be selected to allow a sample size that allows for 
opportunity to contrast and compare results between supply chains, but is sufficiently small 
to allow for rich qualitative research to be conducted and allow comprehensive analysis of 
the research data identified. All case studies must now be in a position where they have 
been removed from the „P1‟ status, though it is acceptable that arrears may not be fully 
recovered. Supply chains will be selected at random from the population of Rotatives P1 
components.  
For each case study a sample of four individuals will interviewed, using the same standard 
question set. Each individual will represent a different functional groups and must be the 
individual who lead the recovery activity for the given supply chain; functions to be covered 
include Supply Chain Planning and Control, Manufacturing Engineering, Quality and 
Purchase. This will allow for research data to reflect the different perspectives of those 
involved with the day to day recovery.  
 
3.5 Research Instruments 
Two principal research instruments will be adopted. Focus groups to establish the 




The focus group will allow the model to be developed following discussion about the 
dimensions that are relevant for Rolls-Royce supply chains, the focal group will be 
composed of key individuals involved in the cross-functional management of Rolls-Royce 
supply chains: Regional Purchase Manager, a Technical Supplier Manager, a Supplier 
Development Leader and a Manufacturing Production Planning.  
Interviews will be used to collate the primary research from those cross-functional individuals 
involved in recovery activity of a supply chain.  The structured interview offers several 
significant benefits over other data collection techniques. These include ensuring a timely 
response in collecting the data, consistency in capturing feedback from various interviewees, 
interviewer is able to offer clarity over the purpose of the question being asked, where 
necessary the interviewer can probe into responses or prompt more detail to ensure a rich 
deep response and avoid the failings of group dynamics.  
 
3.6 Primary Research Interview Process 
Primary data collected through a 1 on 1 interview arrangement. Interviewees will be 
recorded, and reminded that their responses will remain confidential. Interviews will be 
commenced with a background to the study, and an explanation as to what is meant by the 
term „critical supply chain failure‟ within the context of this study. The data will be gathered 
utilising a structured interview format, whereby the users will be given an „open‟ question and 
invited to offer a response, where necessary to provide richness in response follow-up 
questions related to the response may be directed at the interviewee. Prior to the interview 
the interviewees will be briefed that they are going to be interviewed on their experiences in 
recovering their nominated supply chain, but no further detail will be provided at that stage. 
The interviews will happen on-site in Rolls-Royce within a closed conference room to avoid 
distraction during the interview process.  The responses will be recorded down by the 
interviewer. Time constraints will not be put on responses to individual questions, though the 
interview should not exceed one hour in total. The results will be compiled and analysed 
separate to the interview. A summary of the key points will be issued back to participants for 
review within two weeks of the interview to allow for opportunity of verification between 






3.7  Question-Set 
The question-set will be split into two sections, part 1 which is an „open ended‟ question to 
prompt the interviewee to respond on activities involved in recovery of their supply chain 
failure, and part 2 which assess the relevance of HRO principles to the supply chain failure.  



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS 
 
4.1 Developing a complexity methodology  
As discussed in the literature review complexity of supply chains is subjective, where no 
formal scale or measurement currently exists in being able to measure the relative 
complexity of given supply chains. The variables of a supply chain are very inconsistent – no 
of participants in the supply chain, geographical location, legal restrictions, types of „value 
adding‟ processes being worked within the supply chain – to name only a handful - with such 
heterogeneity in the composition of supply chains, a definite scale to measure complexity 
would be hard to establish.  
Therefore a measurement system was devised with an organisational focus group of 
Purchase and Engineering professionals within the Rolls-Royce group to identify and agree 
common dimensions of complexity, with a scale of relative complexity for each dimension 
being devised. The group consisted of Regional Purchase Manager, a Technical Supplier 
Manager, a Supplier Development Leader and a Manufacturing Production Planning and 
Control Manager. The group were asked to consider complexity under two broad headings, 
that of „Supply Chain Complexity‟ and „Product Manufacturing Process Complexity‟. Supply 
Chain complexity was intended to take into account the practical and commercial 
dimensions of a supply chain that influence complexity, such as geographical footprint or 
type of commercial arrangement. Product Manufacturing Process complexity on the other 
hand was intended to be a means of assessing complexity associated with the manufacture 
of the product itself, and identify inherent issues around how product design or 
manufacturing process may influence the task on the supply chain.   
Against the category type of complexity for both Supply Chain and Manufacturing 









Categories and Dimensions of Complexity 
Supply Chain Complexity Product Manufacturing 
Process Complexity 
No of tiers in the supply chain Point in product lifecycle 




Commercial „configuration‟ or 
arrangement 
Component safety criticality 
Number of organisational 
interfaces with Rolls-Royce 
Delivered state (e.g. raw, semi-
finished or finished) 
Replenishment Lead-time Industry standard „Right First 
Time‟ quality levels. 
Customer Load in 1st tier Supplier Cost 
 
Table 4: Focus Group Identified „Dimensions‟ of Complexity 
 
For both categories a total of 6 individual dimensions were selected, these were considered 
to be the most significant influencers of complexity within a supply chain (listed above). 
Whilst clearly not an exhaustive list it was intended that the list should be of sufficient length 
that included all the „material‟ drivers of complexity within a supply chain.  For each 
dimension a scale was then agreed for the rating in order to provide clarity on the criteria; 
these scales varied by each dimension but were between 2 to 4 increments across each 
dimension. A descriptor was provided for each rating along the dimensions in order to 
provide clarity in assignment, avoiding ambiguity.  
In order to provide an arithmetic value to complexity, and provide easy comparable 
assessment between supply chain‟s a numeric value („score‟) was assigned to each rating 
along the scale – with the greater the value indicating increased levels of complexity for each 
dimension. The maximum score for each rating was 12, with the lowest score between 2 to 6 
dependent upon the number of increments along each dimension. Effectively this means that 




either supply chain complexity or manufacturing process complexity) and then an overall 
number could be given as an indicative value of the complexity associated with a supply 
chain overall. Therefore each supply chain could score up to 72 for both the categories of 
supply chain complexity and product manufacturing process complexity – with the higher the 
rated score, the higher the level of complexity associated. Then the total numbers from each 
category are summed together to provide an overall rating for each supply chain, of which 
there would be a maximum score of 144. The overall score, whilst diluting the specific focus 
on where complexity was in the supply chain 
A brief explanation of each dimension identified is explained below, with some supporting 
information on the scale of each dimension and logic behind each scale: 
Supply Chain Complexity 
Dimensions No of Tiers Global Reach
Commerical Configuration / 
Arranagement
Number of Organisational Interfaces 
with Rolls-Royce
End to End Supply Chain 
Replenishment Lead-Time
Rolls-Royce Customer 
Load Volume in 1st Tier 
as a %age of Total Load 
(Power / Influence)
Low Supply 2 2 UK Region 2 Internal Supplier 3 2 3 <6 months 2 <100% 3
3 4 Europe 4 Risk / Revenue Partner 6 3 6 <12 months 4 <75% 6
4 6 North America 6 Joint Venture 9 4 9 <18 months 6 <50% 9
5
8





































Table 5: Supply Chain Configuration Dimensions of Complexity  
 
Dimension 1: Number of „Tiers‟ of a supply chain 
This dimension is intended to identify the importance of „depth‟ of supply chain as an 
indicator of complexity. The group agreed that the greater the number of tiers (or supply 
chain partners) the increased likelihood of mis-alignment between supply chain partners, 
made communication of requirements and specification information down the supply chain 
more challenging, disruptions or delays would take more time to become apparent (and 
contained) and meant that the customer was less likely to have line of sight and control over 
the end-to-end supply chain should intervention be necessary to resolve a supply or quality 
or problem. It was agreed that the most simple supply chain would be no less than two tiers 
(including Rolls-Royce), for example where raw material houses may supply Rolls-Royce 




recall occurrences of up to seven tiers. Up to eight increments on the scale were identified 
that allowed a grading of the dimension between 2-7.  
 
Dimension 2: Geographic „Global‟ Reach of a Supply Chain 
Geographic „Global‟ Reach of a Supply Chain was intended to be a proxy for complexity 
arising from the geographical spread of supply. The group agreed that geographic spread 
presented challenges on two fronts, the first physical and the second cultural. The further the 
supply chain from the point of consumption (in the case of Rotatives, its UK manufacturing 
facilities) the greater the cost and time required to deploy technical resource to jointly resolve 
issues with suppliers, return-repair loops for non-conforming hardware became longer and 
the greater the likelihood of issues surrounding the physical transportation from point of 
supply to the point of consumption. The cultural challenge, the group agreed arose from 
differences in the way problems were shared or resolved, particular social or political 
challenges that may inhibit supply issues – for example needing to apply through a timely 
Visa process to visit Chinese suppliers. Whilst it was agreed that to some extent cultural 
challenges were perceived, it was recognised that cultural differences did increase 
complexity in supply chain management. The group prioritised the six regional purchase 
teams by perceived complexity factoring in both the physical and cultural challenges 
associated with each region, these were shown on the scale by a gradient of up to 6 
increments dependent upon location.  
 
Dimension 3: Commercial Configuration / Trading Arrangement 
This dimension was intended to reflect that across the full portfolio of vendors the Rolls-
Royce Group manages a spectrum of commercial arrangements from medium to short term 
„arms length‟ trading arrangements to long-term „risk and revenue sharing partners‟. The 
group also sources internally from other domestic manufacturing plants. The group agreed 
that in the majority of cases, the longer and more integrated the relationship with the supplier 
the less complex became the relationship – with long-term suppliers typically allowing free 
access to sites, collaboration on joint technologies and processes, greater levels of senior 
management influence and a greater willingness to be open with problems. Whilst this was 
generally accepted as being a reasonable logic it was noted that there were examples „long 
term relationships‟ that did not always engender such a co-operative arrangement, although 




complexity in dealing with was internal suppliers, for whom clearly access and influence 
within the company was very significant.  A four scale rating was selected for this rating, the 
scale was determined by the level of vertical integration between Rolls-Royce and the 
supplying company.  
 
Dimension 4: Number of organisational interfaces with Rolls-Royce 
The Rotatives Supply Chain Unit is one of 11 SCU‟s within the Rolls-Royce Group. 
Suppliers, particularly larger suppliers may supply hardware to more than one SCU. This is 
likely to increase the number of interfaces the supplying company has with the Rolls-Royce 
Group, particularly with respect to technical support – where cross commodity support is not 
aligned solely to one SCU, as is the case with the commercial management of a supplier. 
The Group agreed that the greater the number of interfaces, the more likely there is to be 
conflict or variance in communication or message transmitted to suppliers, or duplication of 
task, which in turn overburdens the supplier and reduces the line of sight between supplier 
and Rolls-Royce. Where a supplier provides a common, non commodity specific component, 
such as washers or nuts they may interface with many SCU‟s, although it is most likely that 
suppliers will typically interact with 2-3 SCU‟s as part of routine ordinary business. 
Accordingly the group agreed to define a scale of four potential interface (with each SCU 
supplier management team counting as a single interface), ranging from <=2 to 5+ 
interfaces.  
 
Dimension 5: End to end supply chain replenishment lead-time.  
Replenishment lead-time is the end to end time associated with sourcing raw material to 
delivering a fully finished asset to the customer. Replenishment lead-time is a reliable proxy 
for the complexity within the supply chain. Typically long lead-times are indicative of „alien 
and stranger‟ part demands, sparse raw material supply, reliance on low capacity supply 
sources and lengthy manufacturing routings. The group agreed that lead-time could be taken 
as an indicator of complexity. Most Rotatives SCU components have a total replenishment 
lead-time of between 6 to 36 months. A six scale rating was developed for this dimension, 






Dimension 6: Rolls-Royce Customer Load as a %age of total load in 1st tier supplier 
Influence and power leverage in the customer-supplier relationship is typically determined by 
the significance of Rolls-Royce load volume as a customer relative to other customer load. 
%age of load in first tier supplier is typically a proxy for the influence and power held by 
Rolls-Royce within the supply chain; with a greater level of load Rolls-Royce usually has 
ability to yield greater influence in securing scarce resources within a supplier to resolve 
issues, in getting flexibility to meet changing customer requirements, in gaining access to 
sites to collaboratively understand problems. Where Rolls-Royce does not yield influence, 
there may not be a priority in suppliers on resolving issues or limit access to cash resources 
for activities such as capital investment or securing provision of raw materials further down 
the supply chain. Clearly, influence in the first tier supplier does not necessarily mean Rolls-
Royce hold influence within the extended supply chain, though as the 1st tier supplier is 
typically the partner in the supply chain who adds the most value the group agreed that this 
was a valid measure that would influence complexity. A five scale rating was provided for 
this dimension.  
 Product Manufacturing Process Complexity 
Dimensions Maturity Level
Manufacturing Technical 
Complexity Component Safety Criticality
Delivered State: Raw, Semi or 
Finished
Industry Typical Quality Delivered 















3 Typical declared defects per unit 













6 Typical declared defects per unit 
from Supplier =>1 & <2 












9 Typical declared defects per unit 
from Supplier =>2 & <3 






Complex and Novel 
technology (e.g. Inertia 
weld)
12
Critical Class 'A' Component
12
Bought out Finished & packaged
12 Typical declared defects per unit 





















Table 6: Product Manufacturing Process Dimensions of Complexity  
 
Dimension 1: Maturity Level in Lifecycle 
The position at which the engine sits in its overall lifecycle provides an understanding of how 
mature the component designs within the engines are. The more mature an engine is the 
more likely faults around „design for manufacture‟ have been resolved, preferred methods of 
manufacture identified to ensure maximum possible „right first time‟ levels, failure modes of 
manufacture identified and fixes put in place, and the more knowledge there is around 
acceptance standards. Therefore, the group agreed that a component supplied to support an 




less complex to technically deliver then a component supplied to, for example, the Trent 
1000 programme which is still in engine development phase. The group also identified an 
exception to this rule, identifying „stranger and alien‟ parts which are delivered to support 
engines in the decline phase of the engine cycle. Supply of these components is typically 
associated with older materials, „aged‟ acceptance standards and often challenges around 
supplying all of the necessary technical paperwork. Though not necessarily as complex as 
engine development phase component manufacture, it was agreed alien and stranger parts 
were more challenging then mature engine components. Therefore the group identified a 
three scale rating for „Maturity in lifecycle‟. 
Dimension 2: Manufacturing Technical Complexity  
Manufacturing technical complexity was intended to reflect that there is a range of maturity in 
the processes that Rolls-Royce subcontracts out to its supply chain. The group agreed that 
manufacturing technical complexity could be driven through novelty of a process (i.e. limited 
industrial experience in applying a process) or could be influenced by how the relative „ease‟ 
of being able to operate or control a process (i.e. inertia welding has significant process 
variables challenge highly capable engineering organisations). A four scale rating was 
agreed by the group that reflected the most likely combinations likely to be observed in 
manufacturing technical complexity.  
 
Dimension 3: Component safety Critical  
Components that have demanding operating conditions (e.g. typically rotating components 
such as turbine discs or discs and drums or turbine blades operating in high temperatures) 
are typically classified as „critical components‟. Regulatory authorities place additional 
requirements for traceability and control on these components to ensure the integrity of 
these assets. Additional requirements usually include greater levels of end-to-end supply 
chain traceability, increased levels of inspections with tighter tolerances and more 
comprehensive concession requirements to ship hardware that does not meet specification. 
Historically supply of critical components are typically more problematic, the increased level 
of regulatory requirements typically disrupt the flow of hardware through suppliers whilst 
non-conformance issues are resolved and there is a higher level of „scrap‟ hardware. 
Accordingly the group agreed that acknowledgement in the category of critical versus non-





Dimension 4: Delivered State (raw, semi-finished or finished) 
Dependent upon the intended destination of a component it may be delivered into Rolls-
Royce in a number of finished states, typically these include forged / casted material („raw‟), 
semi-finished components, finished components or finished components fully packaged. The 
„more complete‟ the hardware the greater the compliance requirements to SABRE (supplier 
standards guide), therefore the number of inbound acceptance parameters on a forging are 
significantly less than that of packaged finished component (e.g. finished hardware will have 
dimensional & cosmetic inspection standards). The group agreed that the more „value add‟ 
that the supplier had been involved with the greater the likelihood of occurrence of problems 
that may disrupt the flow of parts. The group agreed a four rating scale for this dimension to 
reflect the typical states hardware is received into Rolls-Royce from its supply chain.  
 
Dimension 5: Industry typical Quality „Defects Per Unit‟  
„Defects per unit‟, often referred to as „DPU‟ or „Delivered DPU‟ is a numerical value 
associated with the defects received by Rolls-Royce upon receipt of an asset. Assuming that 
the defects are declared, and where necessary concessed through the relevant approving 
engineering authorities, defects can be tolerated. DPU is a proxy though for the levels of 
„right first time‟ manufacture. On some components, given the engineering complexity, 
variances to drawing are a natural occurrence of the process – although in some 
occurrences they are reflect errors in the method of manufacture or instable manufacturing 
processes. The greater the level of DPU delivered the more likely there will be disruption to 
the flow of a part, thus impacting lead-time, and in turn impacting timely delivery of the 
hardware to the customer. Defects in manufacture typically cause delays for rework, 
extended inspection time, preparation of concession and time for approval of concessions 
within Rolls-Royce. For each component commodity there is an expectation on the DPU rate 
on inbound hardware. Based on the typical observed DPU the group agreed a range of 
DPUs that would be expected in from the supply chain, a four scale rating was agreed.  
 
Dimension 6: Cost of unit   
Cost is a significant influencer of rework remedies used to address non-conformance. Rolls-
Royce delivered components (excluding low value „c class‟ hardware, such as nuts and bolts 




financially accountable for the cost of hardware, and consequently will fund any scrap or any 
undeliverable hardware the greater the cost of the hardware the greater the likelihood that 
vendors will look to rework / repair non-conforming assets as oppose to dispose of them. 
This can typically cause delays and stagnation in hardware flow whilst rework or non-
conformance is managed. In the most extreme cases where there have been caused repeat 
occurrences of non-conformance this can cause very significant increases in lead-times, 
consequently impacting delivery lead-times. Where the financial value of parts is lower the 
cost of repair is typically greater than the value of the asset, making rework or repair 
uneconomical. As cost increases the more likely a vendor is to „keep hold of‟ non-conforming 
asset in an effort to repair. The group agreed a four scale rating for cost of unit, with the 
greater the cost the greater the complexity.  
 
Visualisation of Complexity Categories  
In order to be able to visually present and compare case study examples from the supply 
chain a visualisation map has been prepared to visually illustrate the complexity scoring for 
each supply chain. 
The x-axis shows the product category score, with users being able to rank themselves up to 
a total score of 72 (to support the scale the matrix shows a top score of 80). The y-axis 
shows the product manufacturing process complexity category, again with users being able 
to plot their score up to a maximum of 72.    
The colour scheme is intended to reflect an increasing level of complexity, with progression 
from yellow, through orange and to red indicating increasing levels of complexity based on 
the rating provided. The rating system allows there to be three levels of complexity along 
each dimension. For the purpose of this study these relative complexity positions are 
categorised as low, medium and high.  Table 7 shows supporting annotation along each 
category dimension to guide on the typical characteristics you would expect to find for each 








An unpopulated example of this complexity map is shown below: 
































Low Complexity Product / 
Low Supply Chain 
Complexity
Medium Product 
Complexity / Medium 
Supply Chain Complexity
High Product Complexity / 
High Supply Chain 
Complexity
'C' Class Components, Non-Critical 
Components.
Simple Manufacturing Processes. 
e.g. Brackets, Nuts, Bolts, Rings
Complex Components, either non-critical or 
critical. 
Complex, but mature, Manufacturing 
Processes
e.g. Conventional Compressor Discs
Complex Components, critical in nature.
High complex or novel Manufacturing 
Processes












































































































































































































































































































































































4.2 Selected Case Studies 
All four case studies identified for analysis are current „live‟ Rolls-Royce aerospace supply 
chains within the Rotatives Supply Chain Unit that have within the last 18 month period 
suffered a critical supply chain failure that has either caused either an OEM engine build 
stop or an „aftermarket‟ clock-stop within the Repair and Overhaul network. No specific 
selection criteria were established for the short-list of these four supply chains, other than 
being  able to access the relevant information and personnel being a necessary pre-
requisite.  
In all four cases these supply chains are no longer causing build or clock-stop disruption, 
though they may not have necessarily been recovered back to zero arrears.   
The name of the suppliers and the names of the Rolls-Royce individuals who have been 
involved with managing each respective supply chain have intentionally been kept 
undisclosed.  
The next four pages show a case study overview for the four identified case studies, 
showing the complexity assessment outcome for each supply chain following review with the 
supply chain owner (the aligned „Regional Purchase Manager‟), in addition to a summary of 
the summary chain (products, locations, rates / volumes, typical failure modes) and a 
populated complexity map for each supply chain. This is then followed by a single complexity 






















The below map is a visual comparison of the relative complexity for each of the 4 identified 
case study supply chains.  
 




4.3 Case Study Interview Annotation/Commentary 
Question 1 (Part 1): When aware of the supply chain failure what activities/actions did your function become involved with to a) 



















At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When escalated via ME due to 
customer criticality – “after it all 
blew up”.  
 
What were the key activities 
commenced? 
 
 Customer Complaint triggered - 
PIRs commenced on the key 
deliver failures. 
 On-site visit to “see what was 
happening” – RR personnel to 
vendor site.  
 Supplier Manufacturing 
Managers, Production Leaders, 
Quality Manager visit to RR UK 
to review acceptance standards. 
 WIP Review status on all 
hardware within the supply 
chain.  
 Operators from the UK deployed 
into vendor to offer training 
programme.   
 Master improvement programme 
plan agreed. 
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR Quality Lead 
 Quality Manager at Vendor 
 Manufacturing Manager at 
Vendor 
 RR Inspectors 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When parts achieved P1 customer 
critical status, due to an internal 
manufacturing capability failure 
which compounded the problem.  
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 PIR review on all non-conforming 
hardware.  
 Review of possibilities to deploy Prod 
Permits / DARs to ease overall flow.  
 Review of acceptance standard 
concerns raised by vendor.  
 On-site visits by Broach and 
Inspection Engineering specialists to 
address capability gaps at the 
vendor.  
 Commenced a re-validation 
programme on all hardware delivered 
out of vendor.  
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR ME 
 Additional RR dedicated ME 
resource 
 RR process specialists – inspection 
capability teams.  




At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 Build-stop for Energy business.  
 
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 Engaged in sentencing of non-
conforming WIP at vendor site.  
 Extended lead-times and 
implemented safety stock for vendor 
protection.  
 More frequent communication 
channels for delivery information.  
 Commenced formal Delivery Failure 
Investigation report 
 Reviewed opportunities to reduce 





Who was involved? 
 
 RR MRPC/RR PP&C Mgr 
 Vendor MRPC 




How long did containment take? 
 




As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not have 
















How long did containment take? 
 
 Up to 3 months, though some 
outstanding issues remain due to 
complexity of the problem.  
How long did containment take? 
 
 Initial identified issues, roughly 1 
month. Other open issues still 
ongoing.  










At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 Not involved in recovery activity. 
No inbound delivered quality 
issues or scrap.  
 






Who was involved? 
 
 
 None.  
 
 
How long did containment take? 
 
 None.  
 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery performance was 
recognised as causing a delivery 
issue.  (Directed by line manager) 
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 PIR review on all non-conforming 
hardware.  
 Reviewed all 8Ds completed at 
vendor.  
 Review of possibilities to deploy Prod 
Permits / DARs to ease overall flow.  
 Review of RQSC acceptance 
standard concerns raised by vendor. 
 Establised a technical ownership log.   
 On-site visits to complete 
manufacturing risk assessments.  
 
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR ME 
 Additional RR dedicated ME 
resource 
 RR process specialists – Surface 
Engineering Technology and RR 
Labs.   
 Vendor ME team 
 
 
How long did containment take? 
 
 Roughly 3 months.  
 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery commitments started 
impacting plant performance / 
customer commitment dates.  
 
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 Implementation of a scheduling 
system for capacity slots.  
 Daily logistics calls between vendor 
and RR to become aware of delivery 
issues.  
 Load and Capacity analysis. 
 Monthly Customer Programme 




Who was involved? 
 
 RR Plant MRPC / PP&C Manager 
 Purchase MRPC  




How long did containment take? 
 
 
 Roughly 3 months to implement and 



















At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 On receipt of repeat non-
conformances inbound from IHI.  
 
What were the key activities 
commenced? 
 
 Customer Complaint triggered - 
PIRs commenced on the key 
deliver failures. 
 On-site visit to “see what was 
happening” – RR personnel to 
vendor site – commenced with 4 
weeks of recovery activity 
starting.  
 Assessment of inbound material 
to ensure it met satisfactory 
standard before leaving Japan.  
 Supported visit by local RR ME-






Who was involved? 
 
 
 RR Quality Lead 
 RR ME-P 
 Vendor Quality Manager 
 In-region RR ME-P.  
 
 
How long did containment take? 




At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery performance was 
recognised as causing a delivery 
issue.  (Directed by line manager) 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 PIR review on all non-conforming 
hardware.  
 Assessment of inbound material to 
ensure it met satisfactory standard 
before leaving Japan.  
 Visit to Japan to review all non-
conforming WIP and rework 
methods; to walk shop identifying 
„bad practices‟ and process capability 
gaps.  
 Review of possibilities DARs to ease 
overall flow.  
 Review of RQSC acceptance 
standard concerns raised by vendor. 
 Established a technical non-
conformance progression log to 
manage future non-conformance.  
 Supported visit by local RR ME-P for 
training (visit duration 2 weeks) 
 Identify follow-up activities; 
valuestream map  opportunities, 
potential hazards in future (e.g. kit) 
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR Quality Lead 
 RR Plant ME  
 RR ME-P 
 RR Specialist ME resource 
 In-region RR ME-P.  
 Full team on-site at vendor. 
 
 
How long did containment take? 
 
 Roughly 3 months.  
 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery performance was 
recognised as causing a delivery 
issue – Build stop to customer.  
 
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 Managed the non-conformance 
returns decision to ensure sufficient 
coverage to support customer 
requirement in UK. 
 Governance structure to ensure 
regular sustainable pipeline of WIP 
visible – joint activity with RR in-
region MRP. 
 Adapted ability of vendor to deliver in 
Engine kits of discs, not single line 
units. 
 Commenced formal Delivery Failure 
Investigation report 
 Schedule alleviation opportunities to 
increase capacity.  




Who was involved? 
 
 RR MRPC/RR PP&C Mgr 
 Regional MRPC 
 Regional Purchase Manager 






How long did containment take? 
 
 Up to 3 months, though some issues 
still ongoing.  
 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery performance was 
recognised as causing a delivery 
issue – Build stop to customer.  
 
What were the key activities 
commenced? 
 
 “Micro-management” of material 
coverage/availability to support 
customer programme. 
 Interface and co-ordination of 
Manufacturing visits with local 
vendor team in Japan.   
 Worked with Vendor to look at 
short, medium and long term 
fixes to capacity.  
 Reviewed opportunities to 
outsource hardware supply to 
new vendors.  
 Generated overall improvement 
programme plan for recovery of 
this supply chain. .  
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR Regional Purchase Lead 
 RR MRPC 
 Vendor Programme 
Management team 
 Interfaced with: RR ME/Quality 
functions. 
 
How long did containment take? 
 
 Up to 3 months, though some 













Supply Chain 4: 
European Based 






At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 On receipt of repeat non-
conformances from the vendor.  
 
What were the key activities 
commenced? 
 
 Quarantine of bonded hardware. 
 Customer Complaint triggered - 





Who was involved? 
 
 
 RR Quality Engineer 
 Vendor team – completion of 




How long did containment take? 




At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 When delivery performance was 
recognised as causing a delivery 
issue.   
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 PIR review on all non-conforming 
hardware.  
 Review of opportunities to utilise n/c 
hardware at RR.  
 Approved new manufacturing 
process at vendor for subsequent 
batch.  
 
Who was involved? 
 
 RR Plant ME  
 RR ME-P 
 
 
At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 Multiple batch slippages, noted and 
reported as being hazard to delivery.  
 
 
What were the key activities commenced? 
 
 
 Escalation and management of 
failure.  
 Allocation of good hardware on-site 
to assets.  




Who was involved? 
 
 RR MRPC/RR PP&C Mgr 
 Regional MRPC 
 Regional Purchase Manager 






At what point did they report becoming 
engaged in recovery activity? 
 
 Engaged by plant team that 








 Managed expedite of follow-on 
batches utilising new 
manufacturing process. 
 
Liaised with C-class 
management company to: 
 Completed global search to 
secure other conforming assets 
to support short term 
requirements.  
 Resourced supply to a new 
vendor.  
 
Who was involved? 
 
 C-Class Management Team RR 






Question 2 (Part 2): Principle 1 (Preoccupation with failure and surprises): Do we know the failure modes for the root cause of the 












Supply Chain 1: North 
American Domestic 





 Delivered non-conformance 
triggered PIR – responses on 
some PIRs in place, though 
not all.  
 DPU is monitored and tracked 
on inbound hardware, pareto 
and trends recorded. . 
 
 
 A number of manufacturing 
failure modes identified, 
though PIR not in place for all. 
Due to number of issues a qty 
of PIRs still outstanding.  
 DPU is monitored and tracked 
on inbound hardware, pareto 




 Delivery failure investigation 
report completed, identifying 
key root cause issues – 
believe all „necessary‟ 




As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not 
have a Purchase representative aligned 
to this supply chain. 
 
 
Supply Chain 2: Specialist 




 No, because it never resulted 
in scrapped hardware.  
 
 
 8Ds completed on any issue 
that has caused a rework 
(though not necessarily 
disrupted flow).  
 Follow-up necessary with 
concessions, DARs, Prod 
Permits to prevent repeat 
occurrence – joint programme 
of work between assigned 




 For some non-technical 
related delivery failures, 
though not all root cause 
identified.  
 Not sure on the status of the 
technical PIRs, “what is 
opened and in progress, what 





No individual was available to interview 
 






 Delivered non-conformance 
triggered PIR - Responses on 
all PIRs in place and root 
cause actions in place (“in 
history it has been rare to see 
repeat occurrences). 
Collaborative exercise with 
quality.  
 
 PIRs completed by IHI team 
on all local manufacturing 
failure modes, this is reviewed 
for overall „integrity‟ by UK 
assigned ME-P and fix 




 Delivery failure investigation 
report in progress, identifying 
key root cause issues – 
believe all „necessary‟ 
monitoring is in place.  
 
 
 Yes, various issues identified 




Supply Chain 4: European 
Based Liner Supplier for 
Compressor Drum 
Manufacture 
 “ we expect this to be as a 
result of the on-going source 
change.” 
 No formal problem resolution 
methodology deployed in this 
incidence.  
 




 None identified.  
 
 
 Yes, PIR for technical failure 




















Supply Chain 1: North 
American Domestic 





 No, PIRs for technical fixes for 
some issues in place or being 
worked.  Outstanding “bigger” 




 Not certain on cross-functional 
agreement, some PIRs in 
place –but resource in RR and 
vendor preventing close-out of 
all  known issues.  
 
 
 No overall cross-functional 
agreement on root cause fix 
and containment. Though 
local activity ongoing.  
 
 
As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not 
have a Purchase representative aligned 
to this supply chain. 
 
 
Supply Chain 2: Specialist 




 Yes, PIRs for scrap hardware 
implemented.    
 
 
 Yes, PIRs for technical fixes 
either in place or being 
worked.   
 
 
 Yes, for majority of technical 
issues.    
 Yes, for logistical control 
issues.  
 No overall cross-functional 
buy-off of the containment and 




No individual was available to interview. 
 







 “Don‟t know” if cross-
functional agreement has 
been achieved on 




 Yes, lead through Purchase 




 Yes, lead through Purchase 




 Yes, lead through Purchase 
in-region team.  
 
 
Supply Chain 4: European 























Question 4 (Part 2): Principle 3 (Sensitivity to Operations): Were there any informal „signals‟, „cues‟ or „indicators‟ that you noted (or 












Supply Chain 1: North 
American Domestic 





 Level of declared scrap.  
 Trend in submitted concession 
rates  
 Level of enquiries to 
acceptance standard 
 Inbound inspection quality 
issues arising  / level of DPU 
on delivered hardware 
 
 
 Trend in submitted concession 
rates  
 Level of enquiries to 
acceptance standard 
 Inbound inspection quality 
issues reported.  
 
 
 Deterioration delivery rates / 
increase in arrears 
 “Out of flow” material 
 
 
As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not 
have a Purchase representative aligned 
to this supply chain. 
 
 
Supply Chain 2: Specialist 




 None identified  
 
 
 Concession rates being 
processed 
  “Flow”disruption occurrences, 
e.g. application of DAR & Prod 
Permits. 
 Observations of issues within 
the plant by RR ME team 









No individual was available to interview. 
 





 Level of enquiries to 
acceptance standard 
 Inbound inspection quality 
issues arising  / level of DPU 
on delivered hardware 
 
 Level of enquiries to 
acceptance standard to local 
on-site MEP 
 Observations of “working 
practices”.  
 Inbound inspection quality 
issues arising  
 Pareto and repeat occurrence 
of in-process failure modes.  





 Repeated slippages in 
delivery.  
 Increasing levels of WIP / “out 
of flow” material levels 
increasing.  




 Increase in arrears to 
programme 
 Concession rates being 
processed 
 Increasing levels of WIP / “out 





Supply Chain 4: European 




 None identified  
 
 






 „Missed‟ delivery 
shipments/Failure to satisfy 
buffer stock requirements.  
 
 






Question 5 (Part 2): Principle 4 (Commitment to Resilience): What could be done to strengthen our informal networks to prevent 











Supply Chain 1: North 
American Domestic 





 Quality team exchange visits 
of key personnel to address 
key areas of concern.  
 
 Exchange of key people in the 




 Collaborative PIR close-outs. 
 
 
 Exchange of engineering 
specialist & manufacturing 




 Collaborative SORB reviews 
processes.  
 
 Collaborative supply chain 
performance reviews.  
 
 
As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not 
have a Purchase representative aligned 
to this supply chain. 
 
 
Supply Chain 2: Specialist 





 Support of Purchase Business 
Review process.  
 
 
 Monthly “working together” 
workshops between key 
personnel to develop joint 
improvement programmes. 
 On-site weekly visits by local 









No individual was available to interview. 
 






 On-site MEP in attendance at 
Kure 3 days per week to “fix 
issues on the spot” (e.g. 
potential miss understanding 
of standards).  
 
 
 On-site MEP in attendance at 
Kure 3 days per week to “fix 
issues on the spot” (e.g. 
potential miss understanding 
of standards).  
 Strong link required back to 
Plant ME team who typically 
have significant experience / 
LCA approval (the “Extended 
Plant” concept).  
 
 
 Collaborative SORB reviews 
processes.  
 
 Collaborative supply chain 
performance reviews.  
 




 On-site MEP in attendance at 
Kure 3 days per week to “fix 
issues on the spot” (e.g. 
potential miss understanding 
of standards).  
 
 
Supply Chain 4: European 






 Collaborative PIR close-outs. 
 
 
 None Identified 
 
 
 None Identified 
 
 
 Use the SORB Reviews / 
Business Reviews to 


















Supply Chain 1: North 
American Domestic 






 Concession Approving 
Authority 
 
 MRPC monitoring inbound 
deliveries 
 





 Concession Approving 
Authority 
 





 Concession Approving 
Authority 
 




As this is a Rolls-Royce domestic 
manufacturing supply source it did not 
have a Purchase representative aligned 
to this supply chain. 
 
 
Supply Chain 2: Specialist 





 ME aligned to vendor. 
 









 ME aligned to vendor. 
 





No individual was available to interview. 
 






 Inbound Inspector 
 
 MRPC monitoring inbound 
deliveries 
 




 Concession Approving 
Authority 
 




 ME-P on-site in Japan 
 
 MRPC monitoring outbound 
shipments from Japan. 
 
 
 ME-P on-site in Japan 
 
 MRPC monitoring outbound 





Supply Chain 4: European 


















 Quality Manager at Vendor 
 
CHAPTER 5: ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 Analysis and Discussion Points 
 
Question 1: When aware of the supply chain failure what activities/actions did your function 
become involved with to a) contain and b) fix the problem? 
From collating all of the cross-functional responses to the case studies it is apparent that 
there is no “standardised” process of organisational response to a critical supply chain failure 
within Rolls-Royce (at least in a documented sense), irrespective of the level of complexity, 
responses to failure were spoken of as being very functionally lead in leadership and 
outcome of what they were trying to achieve.  
Most interviewees, irrespective of function, had to give serious consideration to „the point at 
which they became involved‟, with a number of individuals struggling to recall altogether 
when they became involved within the case study they were recalling. What was 
symptomatic of all the supply chains (with the exception of case study 4) was irrespective of 
complexity the IPT tended to „come together‟ through a natural process of increasing 
pressure of the business customer, it wasn‟t until customer disruption was already at a very 
heightened level did IPT groups formally recognise themselves or govern themselves 
through a programme management framework.  
The above finding is significant, because in the case of the North American discs supply 
chain and Japan Heavy Industry disc supply chain, case studies 1 and 3 respectively, a 
number of the functions spoke about a „build up‟ in issues that they reported being aware of 
[prior to the failure]. It is apparent that in the more complex supply chains, both in terms of 
supply chain configuration and manufacturing technical complexity the lead-time to a critical 
supply chain failure impacting the customer can be quite significant, with a number of 
individuals reporting back this being in weeks and months in there specific cases. Over this 
time period the supply chain „transmits‟ indicators and signals that highlight that there is 
likely to be a problem (this interim time period and quality of „signal‟ indicating a potential 
failure appeared to be significantly more acute with the complex supply chains assessed, 
versus low complexity case study 4). Effectively what is being seen in the complex supply 
chain is an „incubation‟ period for a failure; in the best case an individual may be able to see 
the full extent of the problem (and forecast the likely impact to the customer that will occur in 




individual may not present the full extent of failure- though if viewed as a whole would 
present the scale of problem. These are explored more in the response to question 4. It 
appears, from discussion, that there is a „cultural tolerance‟ by those individuals to this 
incubation period – though from the interviews if was difficult to assess whether this was 
because the individuals involved didn‟t understand the potential customer implications of the 
supply chain failure, they didn‟t see it as their problem to fix or simply didn‟t care. A 
respondent in case study 1 made a self-reflection commenting that identification and 
intervention should have come at an earlier point.  
In the case of supply chain 2 two respondents reported that they had been well aware of the 
problems in the supply chain for a number of months, but believed they could be „lived with‟, 
as they weren‟t being challenged by the customer to resolve. This raises question over how 
the „signals‟ and „indicators‟ from the supply chain that indicate a potential supply chain 
failure over the „incubation period‟ are recognised and acted upon. 
Upon collective recognition of an existing / or pending supply chain failure all the medium to 
high complexity supply chains (in both configuration and technical respect) adopted a 
reasonably consistent approach in initiating engagement with the troubled supply chain. This 
typically involved a „go look see‟ visit, this was normally instigated or led either the Quality 
Engineer, Purchase MRPC or ME-P. Though there was no standard documented response 
for this engagement it normally consisted of two key phases. The first phase was a short visit 
by a non-technical lead to assess the situation, understand the situation in the vendor, get 
an understanding for what they expected to be an issue, understand from the vendor 
whether there were immediate “quick hits” that could be addressed. This visit would identify 
and scope the problem or the failure, trying to identify any special need or resource required. 
Nearly all respondents across all case studies emphasised the need for this visit to be with a 
short time period (“…a matter of days…”)  
The second phase was deployment of a more specialist technical resource that had specific 
knowledge, either relevant to the product or process. Respondents within the medium to 
high manufacturing complexity emphasised the need to have process specialists available to 
deploy (for example, in case study 1 the Quality Manager of the former UK disc plant visited, 
in case study 2 surface coating specialists were deployed). The more complex the 
manufacturing process, the more likely it was to require specialist resource from Rolls-Royce 
to address it. Interviewees stressed that this second phase of visit allowed for two objectives 
to be achieved, the first was to put containment in and support the immediate technical fix 




to be able to directly access specialist resource over the phone in due course – something 
that does not happen as a matter of course when establishing a supply chain. The supply 
chain planning and control respondent for case study 3 reported that this approach was 
counter to the Group‟s QRT (quick response teams) which are in most cases not technically 
aligned.   
Across the technically complex supply chains a maintained link between the vendor and the 
Rolls-Royce technical specialist support was highlighted as being critical to ensuring the 
effectiveness of the ongoing fix and to prevent and mitigate future issues. Respondents in 
case studies 1-3 also reported the that the long-term fix was only achievable with „ring-
fenced‟ engineering resource within the owning SCU business to address root cause 
manufacturing issues, such as drawing alteration requests and review of acceptance 
standards as routinely „long lead time‟ activities that needed to happen within a significantly 
shortened period to have a step-change to flow of conforming hardware. Though in all three 
cases the respondents acknowledged they were able to secure this resource a number 
commented on the frustration of being able to secure sufficiently at the pace required to 
support the programme. Technical readiness, in terms of the capability of resource and 
having it in sufficient volume at the right time to support programme was identified as a key 
area needing attention to improve Rolls-Royce‟s effectiveness in dealing with complex 
manufacturing process driven supply chain failures.  
Whilst near term logistical management of containment of a supply chain failure was 
consistent across all the case studies reviewed, the Supply Chain Planning and Control 
respondents took a stark difference in approach to managing the event of a critical failure in 
the medium to longer term dependent upon the supply chain configuration. Specifically case 
studies 2 and 3, which were characterised by both vendors having >5 interface points to 
Rolls-Royce (and overall higher level ratings of supply chain configuration complexity), 
respondents reported significant levels of sustained resource were put into on-going 
scheduling and logistics management from these vendors to support both fix and 
containment. Respondents commented that the biggest configuration issue for a supply 
chain in the event of a failure was in maintaining clarity on the signal of what was required to 
support customer programme, which became distorted the more interfaces the vendor has 
with Rolls-Royce. Increasing the frequency of communication was used as a means to 
mitigate this „noise‟ in the supply chain. Respondents also noted that the geographical 
distance of the vendor from the point of consumption was a specific concern during the 




studies 1 & 3 supply chain respondents reported requiring tight collaboration with purchase 
to be certain that hardware shipped was conforming.  
Case study 4, where the vendor was managed by an outside integrating company the 
response was notably different. There was no deployment of Rolls-Royce personnel into the 
identified business, nor any of the integrator firm. Fix and containment were all completed 
remotely.  
 
Question 2: Do we know the failure modes for the root cause of the failure, do we have the 
ability to track and monitor the failure modes? (Preoccupation with failure and surprises).  
 
Similar to responses to question 1 irrespective of the complexity of a supply chain there is 
no-cross functionally standard approach to identify a failure mode and monitor and track 
containment through to fix that takes into account the holistic situation. That said, the 
responses from those being interviewed showed a definite use of tools within functional 
groups to identify failure modes in a collaborative fashion between both Rolls-Royce and the 
vendors. Examples given during the interviews included use of „Problem Improvement 
Requests‟ (PIRs), 8Ds, 7 step problem solving, and delivery failure investigation reports.  
These various tools were all functionally deployed, it was thus unsurprising that when 
interviewees were prompted on the confidence levels of their identified root cause and 
effectiveness of containment and fix they tended to give a cautious laugh and a caveat of 
“…well I think I‟ve got everything I‟m aware of…” . From talking with respondents in the 
session it would seem that the effectiveness of these tools in being of sufficient scope to 
„catch‟ all potential root-causes varied because the tools application varied by the user. 
Equally, the trigger event to instigate a root cause review varied by function – Quality 
respondents reported (across all the case studies) that they would instigate a 7s only of 
receipt of delivered non-conformance or scrap at our vendor; this is an important point, as it 
was pointed out by the supply chain planning and control respondent in the example of case 
study 2, that it is feasible to have significant in-capability at supplier (thus receive no 
hardware shipments), but still have no delivered non-conformance or scrap so subsequently 
have no trigger to review root cause. Thus as a general observation it does appear that 
customer impact and need for root cause analysis have been disconnected, specifically 
when it comes to cross-functional buy-off of root cause failure. The only counter example to 




instigate a PIR on any manufacturing process failure that had stopped flow sufficiently to 
„slip‟ a customer commitment – whilst this still not a cross-functionally accepted process, it 
did link process to customer outcome.   
It was observed that the greater the level of technical manufacturing process complexity the 
more likely it was that ownership of failure mode / root cause identification and fix would 
come under the technical lead to ensure progression and closure of the issue. With case 
studies 2 and 3 respondents indicating that 7-step process was being owned by the 
assigned ME or specialist engineering resource to ensure that the process was completed 
robustly. This is not something that is mandatory at present; principally because of the 
organisation structure means that process owners typically have no line of sight or 
accountability to suppliers during the normal course of business.  
Monitor on repeat occurrences of failure modes was again a variable. Those failure modes 
that directly impacted a Rolls-Royce business metric which are typically retrospective „after 
the event‟ metrics (such as scrap, delivered non-conformance – customer complaints) were 
reported as being monitored and reviewed. Though only case study 2, was there pro-active 
measurement of failure modes at the vendor that would give Rolls-Royce a warning indicator 
that another supply chain failure could be expected in the future.  
Complexity does very „loosely‟ influence what type of problem resolution mode is engaged to 
understand the root cause of a failure, who is to lead and complete the process and what the 
likelihood of close out/ monitoring repeat occurrences is. Though this „loose link‟ has not 
been co-ordinated or planned, the process is de-coupled from customer impact and 
monitoring of failure modes appears to be very re-active, with only one exception found in 
the case studies reviewed. This is an area of focus that could be „sharpened up‟ notably 
within Rolls-Royce, and where complexity could be used to influence the process resolution 
process adopted and appropriateness of follow-up.  
 
Question 3: Have we cross-functionally agreed a fix and containment? How? If not, why not? 
(Reluctance to simplify) 
A near consistent response across all interviewees and case studies here, irrespective of 
complexity there was little confidence that a cross-functional fix and containment had been 
put in place in any of the failures, with the exception of case study 3 – noted below. From 
reading between the lines, and considering the points raised in question 2 with regards to 




unsurprising perhaps that a lack of confidence exists about agreement on the 
appropriateness of containment and fix between functions in the case of supply chain 
failures. A number of respondents expressed that they did not believe containment and fix 
for issues outside of their functional remit was their concern.  
The exceptional case here was case study 3, the Japanese Heavy Industry compressor disc 
supplier, where all respondents noted that a single individual (aligned to Purchase in the 
Japan region) owned and monitored progress about the necessary fix and containment 
actions and that all functions were broadly in agreement on fix and containment. Clearly in 
this case, whether it had been formally instigated or it had happened organically was not 
established, though there was a very clear sense of programme ownership for the fix and 
containment process.  This arguably could be seen to re-enforce the above theory that lack 
of process and process ownership is to account for no agreement on fix and containment, as 
opposed to a fundamental disagreement on the appropriateness of a fix to a certain 
situation.  
It would appear that complexity has no bearing on this question.  
 
Question 4: Were there any informal „signals‟, „cues‟ or „indicators‟ that you noted (or were 
aware of others noting) prior to the failure, that may have in-hindsight allowed us to predict 
the failure? (Sensitivity to operations) 
This question appeared to suggest notable differences between simple and more complex 
supply chains. Respondents indicated that complexity; both in terms of the supply chain 
configuration complexity and manufacturing technical process complexity gave more 
opportunity for „lead‟ indicators to be transmitted before customer disruption was seen in the 
supply chain in terms of failure to the customer.  
The lead indicators discussed were multiple and variable, but in general there was a positive 
relationship between complexity and number of indicators that might suggest an impending 
failure, examples given was: 
 Level of enquires with regards to acceptance of technical standards made to the local 





 Number of non-conformance concessions requests processed through the non-
conformance authority.  
 Deterioration in delivery performance or slippage of schedules noted by the material 
resource planning controller.  
 Evidence of non-conformance on inbound hardware identified by local inspection 
teams.  
In spite of the increased level of indicators a number of respondents noted that in isolation it 
is difficult to see or make judgements or draw intelligence on „standalone‟ elements of 
information, though if these were integrated into a collective picture they give an indicative 
feel for pending issues.  Whilst complexity increased the likelihood of being able to observe 
„signals‟ or „indicators‟ from the supply chain that may be indicative of a pending failure a 
number of respondents noted that trying to co-ordinate individuals to integrate this picture, 
being able to draw conclusion from it and using it as a stimulus for a pro-active response 
would be significantly more of a challenge – and that hindsight in these situations are much 
easier to make an assessment on. Undoubtedly though the ability to successfully receive, 
process and respond to these signals is a key driver the ability to stem the „incubation 
period‟ to a pending supply chain failure discussed in the analysis for question 1, which in 
turn will lessen the impact or mitigate completely similar supply chain failures.  
The case study 4, the European based liners supplier, respondents noted that they had very 
few signals or indicators that could have been used to assess failure as the supply chains 
are managed by a third party company (thus avoiding any direct communication sharing 
between Rolls-Royce and supplier), are manufactured on a short lead-time and they are low 
cost so they typically tend to scrap non-conforming asset thus avoiding sharing any 
intelligence of manufacturing failure.  
 
Question 5: What could be done to strengthen our informal networks? (Commitment to 
resilience) 
In the responses 1-3 there was general consensus amongst respondents that practices were 
in place to strengthen the „informal network‟, although there were differences in how these 
were completed dependent upon the supply chain configuration.  
In the example of case study 2, the UK based Abrasive Coating supplier Manufacturing 




taking place in a monthly customer review (note: this was different to the routine commercial 
review), this was reported as a collaborative session between Rolls-Royce and the vendor to 
discuss progression of PIRs, identify joint opportunities for improvement (examples given 
included drawing alterations requests & relaxed tolerance production permits) and look at 
forward load and capacity issues. This review took place on a rotating basis between the 
customer site and the vendor, which was reported as being important for ensuring that this 
was perceived as a „collaborative working together‟ exercise as opposed to a „customer 
visit‟. The Manufacturing Engineering respondents commented that he used the basis of this 
review for his weekly visits to the vendor site, and that allowed all stakeholders to become 
aligned to the issues.  
Clearly with the case study 2 supplier being located in the UK region this made the type of 
engagement described much less costly and much easier to complete within time-
constraints.  
Respondents in case study 1 and 3 recognised the importance of establishing informal 
networks between Rolls-Royce and Vendor, though presented an approach on how this 
could be achieved for remote suppliers: 
In the case of case study 1, the North American domestic supplier providing Compressor 
Discs the vendor plant and receiving plant had set-up an [informal] rotation programme 
following the supply chain failure. Key individuals from both the manufacturing and technical 
teams would spend 1-2 wk period at their counterparts‟ plants. The visits were intended to 
co-incidence with specific elements of the containment and fix programme. It was 
commented that this was a joint funded exercise, though there was no formal budget for it. 
 
Examples given by respondents in case study 1 included; deployment of inspection 
specialists to the North American manufacturing site to support a validation programme, 
secondment of a quality manager to the UK to get „first hand‟ experience of the defects being 
shipped in from their plant, visit from Production Leader/Manufacturing Manager for the 
North American site to Rolls-Royce UK facilities to understand „best practice‟ for 
Manufacture of the components.  
In case study 3, the Japan based Heavy Industry firm providing Compressor Discs, 
respondents noted that getting external suppliers to release resource to visit the UK was not 
always feasible. It was commented by Purchase respondent that „formal‟ visits to the UK by 




much other then commercial issues.  The Quality respondent noted that they developed a 
training programme for the Japan region based Manufacturing Engineers, on-site in the UK. 
This allowed these individuals an extended period of time (2 weeks) within a UK plant 
manufacturing a similar commodity to get firsthand experience of the defect/failure modes 
and the correction procedures that could be used to address the failures. It was expected 
that this knowledge and experience could be shared directly with the vendor via their weekly 
on-sight visits to the suppliers. It was commented that this was considered the „next best‟ 
option to doing this with the vendor themselves. This case emphasises that as supply chains 
get more complex, informal relationships need to be established across Rolls-Royce 
internally as well as the vendor network.  
Respondents noted this approach in the examples of case study 1 and 3 had offered a 
number of benefits; allowing the development of technical contacts, alignment on product 
and process standards and specifications, insight into the other organisations working 
practices (which were often cross-culture) and a common sense of joint purpose.  
Though there was commentary on what individuals felt had been completed within their 
respective cases to strengthen informal networks there was little offered in terms of how 
these could necessarily be improved or built upon.  
Case study 4, the European based liners supplier was ordinarily dealt with by a „C class‟ 
integrator supplier to the Rolls-Royce group, respondents commented that this made it 
difficult (even if they wanted) to establish any sort of relationship with the vendor in the case 
study. In addition one respondent noted that the use of a „c‟ class outsource management 




Question 6: Who is best placed in the supply chain to flag up this potential failure in future 
occurrences? (Deference to expertise) 
Consistent with question 4 the varied response from interviewees suggested that the 
opportunity to use „expertise‟ within the supply chain as an early alarm was a credible 
mechanism to alert the organisation to potential critical supply chain failures. In case studies 
2 & 3 respondents repeated the use of a number of key individuals being well positioned 




 ME-Purchase who have routine on-site access to vendors, with oversight of 
manufacturing processes, working processes, and vendor in-process quality 
performance (which may notably to vendor delivered quality).   
 Manufacturing technical leads within the plant (in the case of operational assist) with 
access to inbound quality performance (such as defects per units).  
 Local concessions approval authorities within the owning Supply Chain Unit who own 
governance and oversight of all non-conformance concessions approved within the 
supply chain.  
 Plant receipt inspection who oversee the quality of all inbound non-conformance.  
Respondents also noted whilst these are the most well positioned to flag issues, having 
them feeling accountable and able to respond, or having a route / process mechanism to 
respond was still something that needed addressing.  
With the exception of the ME-Purchase none of the above listed would be able to assess 
non-conformance within supply chain case study 4, as the processes, individuals or 
interactions did not occur as part of technically simple supply chains. This substantiates the 
findings that greater complexity can give more opportunities to gather intelligence and 
identify potential failures, and less complex technical supply chains that are remotely 
managed present loss opportunity for interaction, and thus deteriorating richness in 
intelligence. 
 
5.2 Study Limitations 
The analysis and discussion generated through this study of course have their limitations. 
The case studies selected represent a narrow selection of thousands of supply chains 
operated by the Rolls-Royce group, and only a small sample of those supply chains that 
have demonstrated critical failure in the last eighteen months. Generalisation of the results to 
other commodity groups in Rolls-Royce beyond the Rotatives commodity used in these 
examples would need to be carefully considered. By design Rotatives commodities are 
complex critical components, their specifications and tolerance standards are usually tighter 
than other commodity groups, meaning that context is likely to be significant in influencing 
the ability to „read across‟ findings. To understand whether this is the case or not then a 
greater sample size of case studies would need to be evaluated that took into account a 




During the interview process the phrase “...well this supply chains slightly different 
because...” was a common response from the interviewee. What in reality the individual was 
feeding back were the unique characteristics about their individual supply chain; there is no 
„standard‟ supply chain. Even of the four supply chains reviewed as part of the case study 
each had a unique set of circumstances; different manufacturing processes, various 
computations of supply chain configurations. Supply chains are not homogenous; you are 
unlikely to ever find two supply chains with identical characteristics – even looking within the 
same business or commodity group. This does not undermine the benefit or contribution that 
this study makes to the debate around complexity, and its influence on how an organisation 
responds – though it does suggest that interpretation of results and the conclusions are 
rather more an art then a definite science as there will always need to be an interpretation of 
a particular finding onto another supply chain.  
The study has focused on the role played by Rolls-Royce personnel in addressing supply 
chain failure, what it has not done is to try and understand to any depth the role played by 
the supplier in recovering chronically performing supply chains that have demonstrated a 
critical failure; whether a supplier responds in a passive or proactive fashion, what resources 
they deploy, the level of senior attention it gets within the supplier organisation is all likely to 
vary by supplier. It would be naive to think that this has had no influence on the way Rolls-
Royce responds, the pace of recovery from the failure or the future likelihood of a repeat 
failure. This dimension, although likely to be more difficult to assess is important if the full 














CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
Within the scope of the case studies reviewed there is evidence to suggest that the level of 
complexity will change an organisations response to managing a critical supply chain failure, 
this was particularly evident in the way that critical supply chain failures arising from 
manufacturing technical capability issues were responded to. Whilst supply chain 
configuration did appear to have some influence on how the organisation responded it 
certainly was not as pronounced as the manufacturing technical process complexity 
dimension (or would seem as critical in influencing the outcome of recovery) – clearly though 
this is likely to be influenced by the sample of the study being based on Rotatives 
commodities, known for their technical complexity. What the study has confirmed though is 
that any difference in organisational response to complexity is „ad-hoc‟ and not the result of a 
structured or planned intervention strategy that considers complexity as an explicit facet to 
be managed. In general our responses to supply chain, irrespective of complexity, are 
characterised by: 
 A variable „incubation period‟ before there is cross-functional recognition of a 
potential (or actual) supply chain failure, during this period various signal / cues that 
are „transmitted‟ by the supply chain, though typically not understood as part of 
integrated picture; 
 A trigger point for co-ordinated intervention that is normally reactive to a deteriorating 
customer situation, as opposed to pro-active response on intelligence; 
 For anything other than supply chains demonstrating low technical complexity; a two-
visit approach to identifying and containing a critical supply chain failure within the 
supplier – this typically involves supply of specialist technical resource required to 
address the underlying root cause failure; 
 A mixture of root cause identification / problem resolution methodologies, all operated 
by isolated functions that are used to contain and fix the failure (though no single 
overall problem resolution that has cross-functional „buy-in). Dependent on the 
function deploying the methodology, the resource and outcome required are variable.  
The study indicates that there is significant opportunities for learning that can be taken away 




were „well represented‟ in the case study population. As well as understanding Rolls-Royce 
effectiveness in responding to a failure data also suggests there is significant opportunity to 
pre-empt and manage critical failures at an earlier stage to minimize customer disruption 
altogether. To understand what complexity means to the type of organisational response, 
there is more work done to review a bigger sample size of cases – scoping different 
commodities. Recommendations are presented below on how this may be achieved. 
The literature review emphasised the bias HRO literature and application had towards public 
sector „mission critical‟ organisations. To date there has been little work in linking HRO 
principles to commercial organisations, nor application within the supply chain context. The 
objective of a „failure free‟ organisation could see the HRO debate aligned to either supply 
chain management or quality management more generally, after all it could be challenged 
what HRO principles seeks to achieve is no different to lean six sigma or earlier quality 
paradigms.  
The discussion it has generated through review of the Rolls-Royce case studies though does 
indicate that HRO principles can have meaning and value in a broader commercial context – 
even if other new dimensions, such as cost benefit, must also be considered as part of the 
discussion – this may mean accepting HROs in the purest sense may never exist in the 
commercial environments, as situations will arise where failure cost is less then prevention – 
avoiding failure at any cost is understandable when managing air traffic control, though 
clearly is not likely to be the case in a commercial environment.  
Notwithstanding the above even with a narrow study there appears to be opportunity for 
„read across‟ for learning from the HRO principles, for Rolls-Royce this is contained below 
within the „Recommendations‟ discussion. The challenge for HRO as a body of knowledge is 
that it succinctly answers the „what‟ supply chains should be doing to become failure free, 
though is fairly thin on „how‟ this should be done – if it is to be of value to practitioners the 
HRO principles need to be underpinned by a framework of tools, systems and processes 
that put structure about how the principles should be adopted. 
 
6.2 Recommendations  
Understanding how complexity influences organisational response is something that will 
have value for Rolls-Royce, though a larger sample size scoping a greater number of 
commodities is necessary to make relevant the feedback for practitioners who operate 




are then a number of areas where practitioner guidance could be developed and shared 
amongst the group that will be vary according to the complexity of each supply chain: 
 How is the „incubation‟ period identified promptly; what are the signals and who 
would be receiving them across each commodities supply chain? How is the 
integrated „picture‟ of these signals established to allow a warning alert, and what is 
the trigger point for pro-active intervention? Who has accountability for instigating an 
intervention? 
 Across each supply chain how should a response be governed, who should be 
involved, how should it be structured in terms of sequence of activities, what time 
frame should it be expected to happen over, what would the expected outcome of 
each stage be, what resource requirements would be expected at each stage? 
 What is the appropriate problem resolution methodology for the type of failure that 
allows a cross-functionally agreed fix/containment and confidence of „close out‟ on an 
issue.  
As discussed in Chapter 5 the HRO principles when assessed in the context of the four case 
studies, present a number of learning opportunities for the Rolls-Royce business and the 
way it can pre-empt and respond to a critical supply chain failure. Of the identified activities 
though, there is a sequence in which these opportunities should be addressed in order to 
optimise the benefit.  
Firstly, the organisation needs to understand what can be done to identify and contain 
supply chain failures before they even cause any customer disruption – being conscious of 
and being able to respond when a supply chain is entering an „incubation period‟ prior to a 
critical failure.  
To enable this to happen there are three priority HRO principles that need to be considered 
further in Rolls-Royce‟s day to day operations: 
“Sensitivity to operations”; the level of concession traffic, deteriorating delivery performance, 
heightened level of „noise‟ with regards to technical standards acceptability are all lead 
indicators that in isolation do not have much significance, though when viewed side-by-side 
are clear in indicating a more systemic problem requiring intervention. Effectively integration 
of these functionally independent components of information offers a synergy in intelligence 
about what is actually happening within a supply chain. Rolls-Royce needs to clarify what it 




significantly from those reported within the case studies) and think about what systems [or 
culture] changes are necessary to ensure that the „bigger picture‟ is continuously being 
reviewed at an operational level so that failures can be pre-empted, and pro-active 
intervention within a potential failure is acted upon. This is not an activity that can be 
completed for each supply chain out of a central function, for it to be effective it needs to be 
completed routinely within local supply chain management teams that can augment the 
understanding of why particular trends are evident.  
“Deference to Expertise”, those individuals who typically spend the most time in the Rolls-
Royce supply chain are those not operating with a [hardware] delivery accountability (such 
as an MRPC), they are much more likely to be technically biased – such as Manufacturing 
Engineers – nevertheless they are the „front line‟ and are best positioned to understand if 
there is a problem in the supply chain that is likely to trigger a supply chain failure. Equally, 
inbound inspection teams in the plants or manufacturing assembly lines are the first Rolls-
Royce teams to identify inbound non-conformance. For Rolls-Royce to identify and contain a 
supply chain failure within the „incubation period‟, these individuals need to understand the 
importance of their role in early hazard identification which may go onto impact delivery, 
even if it sits outside of their normal technical remit. Rolls-Royce needs to consider how 
these individuals are both empowered and given the tools /access routes identify and 
escalate any concerns. Achieving this shift will require a cultural change, enabled by both 
training and formal accountability which is not currently in place.  
“Pre-occupation with failures and surprises”, the case studies identified that the Rolls-Royce 
functional groups used an array of tools to identify failure modes, root causes and implement 
fixes – 7 steps, 8Ds, vendor PIR reports, 5-whys, delivery failure investigation reports – each 
tool had an adopted functional owner. Whilst the quality of the mechanisms were not raised 
as a concern, the Rolls-Royce group does need to think about review of delivery critical 
failure from a cross-functional perspective – utilising a process framework, that is bought into 
by the other functions and scopes both failure of a supply chain in a logistical and 
manufacturing activity will considerably strengthen the wholesomeness of the content and 
quality of the follow-up actions, which is clearly at present piecemeal. 
The “reluctance to simplify” and “commitment to resilience” principles, which identify the 
importance of cross-functional discussion on the reason for failure and building informal 
networks as a means to mitigate failure, were not identified as priority areas of attention for 




improvement – but if the three former principles are addressed with rigour, then much of the 
benefit of with the latter two principles will already be realised. 
6.4 Further Work 
As identified in the Chapter 5 „Study Limitations‟ this study takes into account a narrow 
scope of supply chain examples, pulling a small number of case studies from a single 
commodity group. Developing the sample size of case studies and expanding the scope of 
this study to take into account more commodities will offer clarity to substantiate the findings 
of this study and understand the potential read across to other Rolls-Royce supply chains of 
the recommendations, both in respect of the response to complexity following a failure and 
how the high reliability organisation principles could be adopted.  
Notwithstanding the above points the Chapter two literature review emphasised the role of 
mitigation strategies to minimise or completely mitigate the impact of a critical supply chain 
failure to the end customer, in particular the Tang (2006b) paper emphasised a number of 
practical supply and demand side mitigation approaches that a firm could adopt to dampen 
supply chain disruption resulting from a critical failure. The bias of academic literature in 
emphasising pro-active deployment of mitigation strategies or managing supply risk through 
„up front‟ supply chain configuration decisions, as opposed to excelling at re-active 
responses to supply chain failure should re-emphasise the need to Rolls-Royce [and other 
firms] that a “prevention is better than cure” approach where at all possible. A 
comprehensive review on supply chain disruption mitigation strategies [scoping both 
demand and supply] available to apply across Rolls-Royce supply chains is necessary, with 
further consideration needing to be given to how knowledge about the available strategies 
and practical guidance and support on their appropriate application is shared with those 
charged with „day to day‟ management of the Rolls-Royce supply chains, and not just 
maintained within a functional „centre of competence‟.  
Within the academic domain the relationship between supply chain complexity and 
management of supply chain failure is largely undeveloped and read-across of HRO 
principles into a commercial supply chain context in order to improve performance of the 
supply chain completely novel.   
The relationship between supply chain complexity, the supply risk exposure it creates and 
the appropriate ways to both mitigate and manage an organisational response in the case of 
failure we could expect to become an increasingly more prominent academic discourse as 




loss account. Headline „trigger‟ events such as the European Ash Cloud and the Japanese 
Earthquake and their consequential business impact are likely to be sufficient in stimulating 
both academic and practitioner interest in this critical area, even if these are the „poster boys‟ 
of more unseen systemic challenges created by complexity within supply chains.  
It is likely that much future academic discussions on the relationship between supply chain 
complexity, supply chain risk and management of supply chain failure will be piecemeal, as 
many of the significant business challenges to remedy failure resulting from complexity 
straddle multiple functional areas. Organisational behaviour discourse is likely to consider 
issues surrounding organisational structure, design and accountabilities within increasingly 
global organisations. Strategy discourse is likely to consider issues around the markets firms 
chose to occupy and some of the inherent supply chain enablers or challenges that may 
arise as a result of those choices. Finance discourse will consider the corporate risk 
associated with a global supply network. All functions will be pre-occupied with an issue that 
identifies a debate or challenge that has arisen from supply chain complexity and how it can 
be resolved. For supply chain academics the challenge will be to „stitch‟ this patchwork of 
cross-functional arguments, issues and debates into something that can allow supply chain 
practitioners to make timely, well assessed and understood business decisions about how 
modern complex globalised supply chains, which themselves are an unavoidable inevitability 
for large corporations, should be managed to both cost-effectively reduce exposure and 
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